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COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE*
NANCY LEONG** & JOANNE MORANDO***
This Article examines a persistent and pervasive problem in
cybercrime law. What counts as “communication” on the
Internet? Defining the term is particularly important for crimes
such as cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and cyberbullying,
where most statutes require a showing that the alleged perpetrator
“communicated” with the victim or impose a similar requirement
using slightly different language.
This Article takes up the important task of defining
“communication.” As a foundation to our discussion, we provide
the first comprehensive survey of state statutes and case law
relating to cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and cyberbullying.
We then examine the realities of the way people use the Internet
to develop a definition of “communication” that reflects those
realities. That is, we aim to provide effective tools by which
prosecutors can address wrongful conduct without punishing
innocuous behavior or chilling speech. We conclude by
proposing a model statute that appropriately defines
“communication.” We recommend that state legislatures adopt
the statute or modify existing laws to match it in pertinent part
and demonstrate how the statute would apply in a range of
situations.
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INTRODUCTION
“Elizabeth Long needs to stop bitching about how she almost
killed herself and go ahead and do it.”1 This message was posted
anonymously and broadcast over a 1.5-mile radius, reaching
thousands of individuals who had downloaded an app called Yik
Yak.2 During a series of events that would become known as
“GamerGate,” Zoe Quinn was forced to leave her home, fearing for
her safety, after her address was posted online.3 This act of revealing
personal information and documents to the public online is called
1. Alyson Shontell, How Two Georgia Fraternity Brothers Created Yik Yak, a
Controversial App that Became a ~$400 Million Business in 365 Days, BUS. INSIDER
AUSTL. (Mar. 13, 2015, 1:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-inside-story-ofyik-yak-2015-3 [http://perma.cc/H6G5-XPBB (dark archive)].
2. Id.
3. Alex Hern, Zoe Quinn on Gamergate: ‘We Need a Proper Discussion About
Online Hate Mobs’, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology
/2014/sep/12/zoe-quinn-gamergate-online-hate-mobs-depression-quest [http://perma.cc
/4S6A-SS26].
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“doxxing,”4 and it has become increasingly common in recent years.5
Brianna Wu, who owns a video game company and develops video
games, woke up to the following message posted to Twitter: “Guess
what bitch? I now know where you live. You and Frank [her husband]
live at [REDACTED].”6 A fake Twitter account titled “Anita Needs
to Die” features a profile picture of Anita Sarkeesian, a feminist
commentator, with photoshopped black eyes and a bloody nose.7
In the past, statutes criminalizing behavior such as threats,
stalking, and harassment generally require that the speaker
“communicate” with the target.8 It is easy to establish that
communication took place when the behavior takes the form of a
phone call or letter directed at the target. But the Internet, along with
various social media platforms and apps, has enabled other forms of
directing abuse at targets for which “communication” cannot be
defined simply as direct messages from one person to another.
Understanding the ways people communicate on the Internet is
vitally important to create effective laws that regulate harmful online
speech and conduct.
In this Article, we present an original empirical survey and
analysis of two types of such laws in the federal code and all fifty
states: cyberstalking laws that prohibit a pattern of online behavior
that poses a “credible threat of harm,”9 and cyberharassment laws
that prohibit online activity that torments or distresses its target.10 We
also discuss, although we do not include in our empirical survey,
4. Id.
5. Andrew Quodling, Doxxing, Swatting and the New Trends in Online Harassment,
CONVERSATION (April 21, 2015, 4:11 PM), http://theconversation.com/doxxing-swattingand-the-new-trends-in-online-harassment-40234 [http://perma.cc/HX4J-GZDB].
6. Ian Miles Cheong, Game Developer Brianna Wu Driven from Home After Death
Threats and Doxxing, GAMERANX (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.gameranx.com/updates/id
/24642/article/game-developer-brianna-wu-driven-from-home-after-death-threats-anddoxxing/ [http://perma.cc/X9Y7-JW96]. In almost all republications and screenshots of
doxxing occurrences, the information at issue has been removed or redacted to avoid
further dispersing the private information. See, e.g., id.
7. Although now deleted, a screen capture of the Twitter account can be found at
Carly Smith, GamerGate: A War on Women Hiding Behind a Mask of “Ethics”,
INDIEWIRE (Oct. 17, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://blogs.indiewire.com/womenandhollywood
/gamergate-a-war-on-women-hiding-behind-a-mask-of-ethics-20141017 [http://perma.cc
/9WAJ-XWSG].
8. See, e.g., infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text (discussing the recent Elonis
decision and whether or not the defendant communicated with the target).
9. See State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/2PRJ
-RRWQ] [hereinafter Cyberharassment Laws].
10. See id.
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cyberbullying laws that specifically target harassment and bullying
among minors.11 These three categories of laws are related and often
overlap, so the distinction among them is not always clear.12 More
importantly, however, all three are intended to address essentially the
same problem—the use of the Internet to engage in speech and
behavior that seriously damages people’s lives.
When we consider the behavior that these laws are designed to
prevent, the need to define “communication” becomes clear. For
example, a law designed to prohibit cyberharassment would be overly
narrow if its scope were limited to emails. A harasser has many other
ways of communicating with a target, such as through Facebook posts
and messages, Tweets, blog posts, and blog comments.13 At the same
time, a law designed to prohibit cyberharassment would be decidedly
overbroad—and would violate the First Amendment—if it prohibited
all negative speech about an individual on the Internet.14
Our project, then, is to develop a definition of “communication”
that will allow for the punishment of harmful speech without
sweeping in innocuous speech or running afoul of the First
Amendment. There are, of course, other issues that must be resolved
in order to draft effective cyberharassment and cyberstalking
statutes—for example, the mental state necessary for criminalization,
the frequency and severity of harmful speech, and the effect of such
speech on the victim.15 Defining what “communication” means in the
online world, however, is uniquely critical for cyberharassment
statutes because the other elements are, for the most part, well
11. See id. We did not engage in a census of state cyberbullying laws for this project,
primarily because, in some instances, the legislative history of cyberstalking and
cyberharassment laws indicates an intention to address the problem of cyberbullying with
these broader laws. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1121–22 (2011). Moreover, other commentators have
systematically examined such laws. See Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of
Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech,
63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 857–64 (2010). Our conclusions about what should count as
communication for purposes of cyberstalking and cyberharassment statutes would,
however, apply equally well to cyberbullying statutes, perhaps with the addition of forums
unique to minors (for example, an intranet message board available exclusively to students
at a particular school).
12. See Cyberharassment Laws, supra note 9.
13. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberbullying and the First Amendment, 14 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 99, 105 (2012) (“Online bullying takes a variety of different forms, some
of which bear a closer resemblance to physical bullying than others.”).
14. See King, supra note 11, at 848 (“[W]e must be cautious not to erode the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); see also Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A.
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575, 577 (holding that a regulation prohibiting “all”
First Amendment activities was “substantially overbroad”).
15. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 27–28.
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defined in other areas of criminal law and it is appropriate to use the
same or similar standards in the cyberharassment context.
We conclude that “communication” on the Internet should be
defined as any online behavior—including, but not limited to,
speech—by an individual who recklessly disregarded a reasonable
likelihood that the target would discover it. We select this standard
for a number of reasons. The use of a recklessness standard with
respect to an individual’s mental state strikes a balance between a
standard requiring actual knowledge—which would in many instances
be very difficult for the prosecution to prove—and mere negligence—
which risks criminalizing accidental behavior.16 By defining
communication as behavior performed with reckless disregard for the
likelihood that the target will find out about it, we sweep in behavior
that an individual knew the target of the behavior would discover, as
well as behavior that an individual consciously disregarded the
likelihood that the target would discover.
Moreover, this approach is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Elonis v. United States.17 Elonis
involved a defendant who posted violent statements about his ex-wife
on Facebook.18 The Elonis district court jury found that the
defendant’s statements would have caused a reasonable person to
interpret the statements as real threats, and he was convicted under
the federal threats statute.19 The issue on appeal in Elonis was
whether the government must prove that the perpetrator intended to
threaten the target, or whether the prosecutor need only show that a
reasonable target would have felt threatened and in fact felt
threatened.20 At oral argument, the justices seemed skeptical that the
prosecution would have to prove intent to threaten, with Justice Alito
noting that to do so “sounds like a roadmap for threatening a spouse
and getting away with it.”21 Justice Kagan instead suggested a
16. See, e.g., DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND
LAWYERING STRATEGIES § 3.08(B)(2)(1) (2d ed. 2010) (“In many other countries it is
considered inappropriate to apply the criminal law to merely negligent acts since the
concept of moral culpability is not sufficiently invoked for people who are just careless.”).
17. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
18. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012); Elonis, 730 F.3d at 323.
20. See Elonis, 730 F.3d at 323 (“This case presents the question whether the true
threats exception to speech protection under the First Amendment requires a jury to find
the defendant subjectively intended his statements to be understood as threats.”).
21. Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2014) (No.
13-983), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-983_4f57.pdf
[http://perma.cc/95UR-6ZYE].
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recklessness standard, which would be easier for the prosecution to
prove.22
The Court held that whether “a reasonable person would regard
Elonis’s communications as threats” was not sufficient to establish
intentional communication because “criminal liability generally does
not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the
defendant’s mental state.”23 Ultimately, however, Elonis is perhaps
most noteworthy for what it did not decide—is recklessness sufficient
to convict someone under the federal threats statute, or must the
prosecution show knowledge? This shortcoming creates substantial
confusion: the lower courts do not know which standard to apply on
remand, and thus the Supreme Court will likely have to address the
issue again.24
The uncertainty left by Elonis does not directly implicate our
purpose in this Article. Rather, it speaks to whether a perpetrator
intends statements to threaten,25 while our concern is with whether a
perpetrator intends or ignores the likelihood that statements will be
discovered by the subject. We think, however—and will explain in
more detail in the body of the Article—that a consistent recklessness
standard strikes the right balance between the dual intent
requirements of the intent to threaten or engage in harmful speech
and the intent to communicate.
Finally, a note about terminology. While our survey of state laws
and cases examines the way that communication is defined for
cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes, we will use the term
“cyberharassment” to refer collectively to both of these types of
statutes. When we are referring only to cyberharassment statutes, and
not to cyberstalking statutes, we will make that clear in individual
instances. In some cases, our analysis will also apply to cyberbullying
statutes, given that those statutes also examine what constitutes
electronic communication. Although we did not specifically review

22. Id. at 8.
23. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
24. Nancy Leong, Guest Blog: Nancy Leong, The Anticlimax of Elonis v. United
States, HAMILTON & GRIFFIN ON RTS. (June 8, 2015), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guestblog-nancy-leong-the-anticlimax-of-elonis-v-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/9RBY-F57M]
(noting that the majority in Elonis stated “it [was] not necessary to consider any First
Amendment issues”).
25. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004 (“Petitioner was convicted of violating this provision
under instructions that required the jury to find that he communicated what a reasonable
person would regard as a threat. The question is whether the statute also requires that the
defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication . . . .”).
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those statutes in our empirical survey, we note where our discussion
extends to cyberbullying statutes as well.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the
importance of defining “communication” on the Internet. We survey
the relevant scholarly literature on electronic communication, noting
that no previous work has examined in detail what it means to
“communicate” on the Internet in light of the myriad ways of doing
so. We then examine the realities of how people use the Internet to
convey information to one another and explain what it should mean
to “communicate” online, taking into account these realities.
In Part II, we undertake an original empirical survey of statutes
criminalizing cyberharassment, categorizing the way that
“communication” is currently statutorily defined and judicially
interpreted. We first survey the way “communication” is defined in
state statutes relating to cyberharassment and develop a typology of
such statutes. We then examine the ways that state courts have
interpreted the meaning of “communication” according to these
statutes.
Finally, Part III develops an agenda for implementing a better
definition of “communication.” We point out the defects in existing
laws, describe how they can be ameliorated, and propose statutory
language that legislators should use in passing new or amending old
cyberharassment statutes. Ultimately, these proposals will yield
cyberharassment laws that accurately reflect the way that people use
the Internet.
I. WHAT QUALIFIES AS COMMUNICATION?
This Part considers what should qualify as “communication” on
the Internet for purposes of cyberharassment statutes. It surveys the
existing scholarly literature, which has not examined this issue in
great detail. It then examines the way that people use the Internet,
taking account of existing technology in a way that neither scholars
nor judges have thus far. Ultimately, we adopt a practical definition of
“communication” based on the way people actually transmit and
receive information via the Internet.
A. A Neglected Element of Cyberharassment
The evolution of cyberharassment law has presented many novel
issues for legal debate, including questions of constitutionality,26
26. Considerable scholarship focuses on what is necessary to make such
cyberharassment statutes compliant with the requirements of the First Amendment. See
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burdens of proof,27 and the feasibility of implementation.28 While each
of these considerations is essential to the formation of the law, we
must still ask a foundational question: What specific conduct is the
legislature trying to criminalize? The answer to that question lies in
how we define “communication,” or, put differently, what it means to
communicate online.
Policymakers and scholars have considered two different
approaches to defining “communication.” The first is target-centric—
it examines how the target of the communication is affected or

generally Andrew B. Carrabis & Seth D. Haimovitch, Cyberbullying: Adaptation from the
Old School Sandlot to the 21st Century World Wide Web—The Court System and
Technology Law’s Race To Keep Pace, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 145–46 (2011)
(analyzing First Amendment concerns of Florida’s cyberbullying laws in contrast to the
seminal cases of free speech in public schools); Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia,
How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693, 700 (2012) (presenting “a
First Amendment primer to guide law-makers”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational
Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705, 705 (2012) (discussing the interaction between the
First Amendment and a school’s ability to punish off-campus cyberbullying); King, supra
note 11, at 848 (2010) (offering “suggestions for how cyberbullying laws can be crafted to
address the problem of online bullying while not eroding First Amendment freedoms”).
27. See, e.g., Kori Clanton, We Are Not Who We Pretend To Be: ODR Alternatives to
Online Impersonation Statutes, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323, 340–41 (2014)
(noting the difficulty in the plaintiff or victim having the burden of identifying a
perpetrator that operated in anonymity); David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark
Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 745, 745–46 (2013) (discussing Fourth Amendment implications in
securing evidence of cybercrime); Aimee Fukuchi, Note, A Balance of Convenience: The
Use of Burden-Shifting Devices in Criminal Cyberharassment Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 289,
289 (2011) (proposing burden-shifting devices because the prosecution is procedurally
disadvantaged in proving the details of the crime that are “peculiarly within the
knowledge of the accused”).
28. We note, moreover, that while many student authors have made interesting and
relevant contributions relating to feasibility of implementation, the issue is relatively
lacking in commentary by established academics and practitioners. See, e.g., Heather
Benzmiller, Note, The Cyber-Samaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the “Innocent”
Bystanders of Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 927, 927 (2013) (discussing the need to
criminalize the role of the bystander that escalates the cyberbullying); Cassie Cox,
Comment, Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and Online
Impersonation Through Prosecutions and Effective Laws, 54 JURIMETRICS J. 277, 277,
286–87 (2014) (noting the difficulties in proving the required culpable mental state);
Arthur Gaus, Comment, Trolling Attacks and the Need for New Approaches to Privacy
Torts, 47 U. S.F. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2012) (proposing that a tort regime be the primary
way to deal with cyberharassment as Internet anonymity makes traditional criminal
culpability difficult); Kate E. Schwartz, Note, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits: The
Need for Updated State Laws Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 407, 409–10 (2009) (noting the myriad types of cyber victimization and
proposing a legislative scheme that anchors liability to the culprit’s intent and the harm the
victim suffered).
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reached by that communication.29 The second is speaker-centric—it
examines the means or platform that the speaker uses to
communicate.30 Yet, a clear definition of communication requires
incorporating both approaches.
In a target-centric discussion of cyberharassment, the focus is on
the wide variety of ways that harassers can harm their targets.31
Targets can be harassed directly32 or indirectly.33 Jacqueline Lipton
notes that “cyberbullying comes in a variety of different forms, not all
of which involve direct communications with the victim . . . . [O]ne
key difference between victimizing an individual in the real world and
online is that the [online] victim is not always the direct recipient of
the threatening or harassing communications.”34 A cyberharasser can
recruit friends or other online networks to execute an attack,35
assuming that the content of the interaction will find its way to the
intended target.36 The target’s personal information can be revealed
29. For example, Massachusetts requires communication directed at a person that
“seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43(a)(1) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
30. For example, Ohio requires only that the speaker “post a message with purpose to
urge or incite another.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (LEXIS through 2015
legislation).
31. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 29 (2014)
(discussing cyberharassment’s ability to affect the “ ‘victims’ professional reputations and
careers, discourage[] on- and offline pursuits, disrupt[] both crucial and ordinary life
choices, and cause[] physical and emotional harm”); Cox, supra note 28, at 277 (noting
that “cyberstalkers can use a wider range of methods, from tracking victims through social
media to impersonating targeted individuals”).
32. Direct harassment was an issue in the Elonis case. See United States v. Elonis, 730
F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). Elonis posted violent statements
about his ex-wife, including “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in
blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Id. at 324; see also infra Section I.A.1.
33. Indirect cyberharassment has very little in common with real-world harassing
activities. See Lipton, supra note 11, at 1112 (“Laws targeted at real world activities often
do not translate well when applied to cyberspace.”).
34. Lipton, supra note 13, at 105.
35. For a discussion of the unique ways the Internet encourages harmful group-think,
see Scott Hammack, Comment, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line
Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 82 (2002).
36. One reporter described this as “crowd-sourced revenge” when her number was
posted on Craigslist in the personals section, leading to hours of people calling her.
Kashmir Hill, What Are the Legal Penalties for Using Craigslist To Crowd-Source
Revenge?, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011
/09/08/what-are-the-legal-penalties-for-using-craigslist-to-crowd-source-revenge/
[http://perma.cc/8NEQ-HQV2]. Most infamous was the case of an ex-boyfriend posting to
Craigslist under the guise of his ex-girlfriend seeking to play out a “rape fantasy.” Kashmir
Hill, A Reason Not to Respond to Rape Fantasy Ads on Craigslist, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb.
16, 2010, 10:12 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/02/a-reason-not-to-respond-to-rape-
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online.37 A cyberharasser can post false information under the target’s
name.38 Some of this conduct is online behavior that leads to offline
harassment.39
The speaker-centric approach to defining online communication
involves an examination of the means or platform that the speaker is
using to engage in speech or other online behavior.40 For example,
one scholar defines cyberharassment as speech channeled through “emails, blogs, instant messenger messages, text or video messages, chat
rooms, on-line social networks, or other websites.”41 Yet even this

fantasy-ads-on-craigslist/ [http://perma.cc/7C8W-SHES]. Tragically, the ad asked for and
attracted “a real aggressive man with no concern for women” who raped the woman. Id.
37. This phenomenon, known as “doxxing,” became the focus of cyberharassment
debates following Gamergate in 2014. “[D]oxxing[] involves scouring the Internet for
personal data (or documents, the source of the word ‘doxx’)—like a person’s name, address,
occupation, Twitter or Facebook profile—and then publicly [posting] that information.”
Emily Bazelon, The Online Avengers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/01/19/magazine/the-online-avengers.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/426K-Y9X4 (dark
archive)]. In the 2014 Gamergate controversy, many outspoken female gamers, developers,
and activists were doxxed as retaliation for their public stances on Gamergate. See Alex
Hern, Felicia Day’s Public Details Put Online After She Described Gamergate Fears,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/23/felicia-dayspublic-details-online-gamergate [http://perma.cc/D3WU-E2SV] (discussing how minutes
after Felicia Day posted about Gamergate, her address and personal email were posted in
the comments section to her original post). Though not relevant to our discussion here, there
has been some interesting debate over the social utility for doxxing as a way to publicly
shame poor behavior (or at least what the online community views as poor behavior). See
Bazelon, supra.
38. Some victims are effectively forced to include a disclaimer on their resume
explaining the negative results the employer will find should they Google their names. See
Danielle Keats Citron, How Cyber Mobs and Trolls Have Ruined the Internet—and
Destroyed Lives, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2014 12:56 PM), http://www.newsweek.com
/internet-and-golden-age-bully-271800 [http://perma.cc/5W4Y-QPUW] (describing one
student’s troubling experience with cyberharassment, during which, at one point, “75
percent of the links appearing on the first page of a search of her name were the attack
sites and disparaging posts”).
39. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62
(2009) (describing various methods of cyberharassment); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 655–56 (2012) (noting the many ways that
cyberharassers can reach their targets); Catherine E. Smith, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow Targets the New Head of the Hate Hydra, 80 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) (explaining one incident of how “online threats led to offline
harassment”).
40. All but five states that have statutes that address cyberharassment use a targetcentric method. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 499);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.749 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
41. Bradford W. Reyns, Billy Henson & Bonnie S. Fisher, Stalking in the Twilight
Zone: Extent of Cyberstalking Victimization and Offending Among College Students, 33

94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015)

2015]

COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE

115

definition from three years ago is outdated because it does not
include app-based technology. As technology has evolved, it is clear
that cyberstalking laws cannot be limited to email or other “one-onone private forum[s]” as it once was.42 The original laws concerning
cyberstalking and cyberharassment often drew parallels to offline
conduct criminalized under stalking and harassment laws, and in
some instances, drew the exact language from those statutes.43
It is important to define “communication” as it relates to
cyberactivity to prevent the all-too-easy comparison to real-world
criminalized activities. Lipton notes the difficulty in analogizing some
types of online communication to offline analogs.44 For example, one
might argue that gathering on a social networking site, such as
Facebook, to make fun of a cyberbullying victim is analogous to
gossiping about the victim out of her earshot.45 But Lipton explains
that the analogy is imperfect: “online conduct has the potential to be
cut-and-pasted all over the Internet, so it is much more likely that a
victim could ultimately access a transcript even when that person is
not the intended recipient of the communications.”46 Likewise, the
harm of online bullying is in some ways greater: “One feature of
online communications is their tendency to become permanent viral
records of comments about an individual.”47 As columnist Amy
Harmon observes, the myriad forms of communication available on
the Internet enable cyberbullies “to be both less obvious to adults and
DEVIANT BEHAV. 1, 1 (2012) (citing Bradford W. Reyns, A Situational Crime Prevention
Approach to Cyberstalking Victimization: Prevention Tactics for Internet Users and Online
Place Managers, 12 CRIME PREVENTION & COMMUNITY SAFETY 99, 99–118 (2010)).
42. Joanna Lee Mishler, Comment, Cyberstalking: Can Communication via the
Internet Constitute a Credible Threat and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable if It
Does?, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 118 (2000) (noting that
cyberstalking can take place “in public forums, rather than personal e-mail” and that
“traditional anti-stalking laws should [therefore] be modified to accommodate activity on
the Internet”).
43. For example, Arizona still bases its cyberharassment statute on offline conduct by
criminalizing electronic communication through “wire line, cable, wireless or cellular
telephone call, a text message, an instant message or electronic mail.” See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
44. Lipton, supra note 13, at 108.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 108–09. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015) (“Here ‘the
crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct’ is the threatening
nature of the communication. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the
fact that the communication contains a threat.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994))); see also id. at 2012 (“Put simply, the
mental state requirement the Court approved in Hamling turns on whether a defendant
knew the character of what was sent, not simply its contents and context.”).
47. Lipton, supra note 13, at 109.
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more publicly humiliating, as gossip, put-downs, and embarrassing
photos are circulated among a wide audience of peers with a few
clicks.”48
As technology evolves and becomes more pervasive, the effects
of cyberharassment will too, and the law should grow to include these
new forms of harassment. Laws must not be so narrowly constructed
as to accidently exclude any potentially harassing conduct. Indeed,
the possibilities for communication—and thus the possibilities for
cyberharassment—via the Internet are so numerous that it is virtually
impossible to name them all, and new apps are emerging every day.49
Stakeholders beyond the legal academy have likewise attempted
to list the ways in which cyberharassment occurs. The legislature and
groups that promote particular public policies often adopt similar
approaches. For example, the National Conference of State
Legislatures offers one such definition: “Cyberharassment usually
pertains to threatening or harassing email messages, instant messages,
or to blog entries or websites dedicated solely to tormenting an
individual.”50 A similar attempt to achieve clarity through specificity
also emerges in the state statutes that we examine in Section II.B.2.51
While some statutes are silent as to what “communication” means,
many statutes (ineffectively) attempt to govern the way people
interact online with an inclusive list of what should count as
“communication.”
What is missing from the literature is a focused examination of
what we mean when we discuss “communication” on the Internet.
While not every cyberharassment statute in existence uses the word
“communication,” most impose a similar requirement using slightly
different language.52 The concept of “communication” is integral to

48. Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies Weapons to Wound from Afar, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1.
49. See Richard Larson, 10 New Social Media Apps To Watch for 2015, SOC. MEDIA
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/10-new-social-mediaapps-watch-2015 [http://perma.cc/4BMT-WJSW] (“Social media and mobile [apps] are still
growing segments in the tech world. New apps for media lovers who are on the go are
being created all the time.”).
50. Cyberharassment Laws, supra note 9. Despite having been updated two months
prior to the writing of this Article, this definition does not include apps. Yet apps are
frequent vehicles for cyberharassment. Recall an example from the Introduction of this
Article: when harassers told Elizabeth Long “to stop bitching about how she almost killed
herself and go ahead and do it.” Shontell, supra note 1. The definition does not directly
address these statements because they were posts on a community forum in an app.
51. See infra Section II.B.2 and Appendix.
52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2013) (“Any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part
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determining what conduct we find worthy of criminalization. For
example, take someone who writes a lengthy series of disparaging and
violent comments about another person online, but does so in a
forum where the other person is virtually certain never to see it—say,
in a private, unshared Google document.53 No information has been
transmitted to the subject of the speech, and we doubt that many
people would view the speech in question as worthy of
criminalization.
By focusing on communication, we capture what is wrong with
cyberharassment, cyberstalking, and cyberbullying—that the target
finds out about the speech and subsequently experiences fear,
disruption, and emotional distress. These are the harms against which
statutes that criminalize threats and other speech are designed to
protect.54 As Justice O’Connor explained in Virginia v. Black55: “The
speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur.’ ”56 Understanding the ways that people communicate on
the Internet, and importing that understanding into our
cyberharassment statutes, is critical to addressing the harms caused by
cyberharassment.
B.

Internet Interaction

This Section develops a typology of the myriad ways that people
communicate online and explains which categories should count as
“communication.” We divide online communication into five
categories based on whether and how the target of the
communication would know of the existence of a particular instance
of Internet behavior.57 While our specific contemporary examples—
Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and LinkedIn—will eventually become

by a wire, radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.”); see
also infra Section II.B.2 and Appendix.
53. See Change Your Sharing Settings, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/docs
/answer/2494886?hl=en&ref_topic=4671185 [https://perma.cc/HEP5-UA7Q].
54. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (noting states’ authority to
punish threats and how certain policies function to protect against these types of harms).
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
57. We use the word “behavior” in this section to encompass both speech and other
forms of online activity. For example, hacking into someone’s Facebook account could
likely qualify as means of communicating with that person, but the word “speech” is
somewhat inapt.
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outdated as technology changes, the categories themselves are
designed to be flexible.
Today, technology allows people to engage in a wide variety of
activities that include simultaneously sharing information with many
friends, acquaintances, or other contacts; engaging with websites by
making comments or posting original content; instant messaging;
and professional and social networking. Additionally, various apps
allow specialized types of communication. For example, one allows
people to track their friends’ location,58 while another provides an
anonymous forum for communication related to a particular
institution of higher education.59 People communicate on the Internet
to perform their work functions, complete their school assignments,
keep in touch with family, meet potential romantic partners, socialize
with new and existing acquaintances, and virtually every other
purpose of human interaction. At the touch of a button, the Internet
enables us to get in touch with almost anyone, anywhere on the
planet, nearly instantaneously.
Social networking is an increasingly popular subset of online
interaction. Several social networking apps have reached over one
million users in less than six months from their launch dates.60 Some
of the top social media websites have over two-hundred million users,
including Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram.61 According to
Facebook’s website, “People use Facebook to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to

58. Find My Friends, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apps/find-my-friends/ [http://
perma.cc/T5CG-HJYG]; see also Jonny Evans, iOS 7: Making Find My Friends Useful and
Less Creepy, COMPUTERWORLD (May 21, 2014, 9:13 AM), http://www.computerworld
.com/article/2476314/apple-ios/ios-7--making-find-my-friends-useful-and-less-creepy.html
[http://perma.cc/E72V-M68K].
59. YIK YAK, http://www.yikyakapp.com [http://perma.cc/XQH4-WGJQ]; see also
Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed That Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn’t Telling, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/popular-yik-yak-app
-confers-anonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html [http://perma.cc/7UMV-4HQC
(dark archive)].
60. Alyson Shontell, Here’s How Long It Took 15 Hot Startups To Get 1,000,000
Users, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/one-millionusers-startups-2012-1?op=1 [http://perma.cc/FD34-2E2K].
61. Shea Bennett, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Vine, Snapchat—Social
Media Stats 2014, SOCIALTIMES (June 9, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes
/social-media-statistics-2014/499230 [http://perma.cc/A7JW-JP6A].
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share and express what matters to them.”62 Facebook has over 1.25
billion monthly users.63
On Facebook, users can be “friends,” which allows them access
to one another’s information, pictures, and Internet posts.64 Users can
privately message one another regardless of whether they are
Facebook friends.65 Users can link posts to their Facebook friends by
tagging the Facebook friend’s username, which then alerts the
Facebook friend that someone has posted about them.66 Given the
popularity of Facebook, we will use that website’s different
communication options as the primary examples for each category of
communication, though the categories are by no means limited to
Facebook and similar websites.
We have divided online communication into five categories: (1)
Direct, which occurs when a speaker sends information directly to the
target of the communication; (2) Tagging, which occurs when the
speaker takes action to call the communication to the attention of the
target; (3) Mutual Forum, which relies on the fact that the speaker
and target are both users of the same online forum and thus are
reasonably likely to see each other’s posts during routine usage of the
forum; (4) Likely Discovery, which occurs when a speaker knows of
or recklessly disregards a substantial likelihood that the subject will
discover the speech; and (5) Discovery in Fact, which encompasses
online speech or behavior by the speaker that the target did in fact
find out about, but that does not fall into any of the first four
categories.
1. Category 1: Direct
Direct communication occurs when a speaker sends information
directly to the target of the communication. On Facebook, a personal
message from the speaker to another user would be in this category.67
Other forums that use direct person-to-person communication
62. About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page
_info [http://perma.cc/LR8D-GP6L].
63. Emil Protalinski, Facebook Passes 1.23 Billion Monthly Active Users, NEXT WEB
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/01/29/facebook-passes-1-23-billionmonthly-active-users-945-million-mobile-users-757-million-daily-users/ [http://perma.cc
/ED5X-6RF3].
64. See Adding Friends, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/360212094049906/
[http://perma.cc/8VMY-8TRL].
65. Sending a Message, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/326534794098501/
[http://perma.cc/2FF4-JFQH] [hereinafter Sending a Message].
66. See Tagging, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/366702950069221/ [http://
perma.cc/R8FV-TNNM] [hereinafter Tagging].
67. See Sending a Message, supra note 65.
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include email, personal messages on Google68 and LinkedIn,69 direct
tweets via Twitter,70 and direct Snapchats.71
2. Category 2: Tagging
Tagging communication occurs when the speaker takes action to
call the communication to the attention of the target. A Facebook
example within this category occurs when a user creates a public post
and attaches the username of a Facebook friend.72
A speaker “tags” a target by using an “@” symbol before the
username of the target.73 When a speaker tags a target, the target
receives an automatic notification of the communication by the
website that the speaker tagged them either in a public post or in a
post that is visible to the target.74 Other users can also see when a
speaker tags a target.75
Other forums that use this method of tagging communication
include Instagram,76 Vine,77 Twitter,78 and LinkedIn.79

68. Contacting People Through Google+, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/plus
/answer/3547351?hl=en [http://perma.cc/YGH3-52QN] .
69. Communicating with LinkedIn Members, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin.com
/app/answers/detail/a_id/137/bid/247/pid/246 [https://perma.cc/WEJ6-4698].
70. A user can tweet directly to another user by including in their message “@”
followed by the other person’s username. For example, a tweet can be sent directly to
President Obama (or, at least, to a staffer who is manning his Twitter account) simply by
beginning the message with “@BarackObama.” The tweet will appear in other users’ news
feeds if they follow both the sender and President Obama. Users who do not follow both
parties can still find and view the tweet by performing a variety of searches, but it will not
automatically appear in their news feeds. See Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER,
https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585 [http://perma.cc/7SV4-D3A6] (“Try posting a
message mentioning a celebrity or person you admire—they often respond to fans.”).
71. Snapchat allows users to send photos directly to another user by using their
phone’s contacts or by entering a username. Finding and Adding Friends, SNAPCHAT,
https://support.snapchat.com/a/find-friends [http://perma.cc/5Y5F-DFUF].
72. See Tagging, supra note 66.
73. How Do I Mention People, Pages or Groups in a Post or Comment?, FACEBOOK
https://www.facebook.com/help/218027134882349 [http://perma.cc/S4KX-UQ4U] [hereinafter
Mentioning People].
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Tagging, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/186952328121982/ [http://perma
.cc/R8LB-NMPR].
77. Vine 1.1, VINE, http://blog.vine.co/post/55515209255/vine-11 [http://perma.cc/8RWPD6DE].
78. Getting Started with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585
[http://perma.cc/7SV4-D3A6].
79. Mention People and Companies in Your Updates, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin
.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/34936/~/mention-people-and-companies-in-your-updates--frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/WJR4-HF5W].
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3. Category 3: Mutual Forum
Mutual Forum communication does not alert the target that the
speaker has posted information about them. Instead, it relies on the
fact that the speaker and target are both users of the same online
forum and are reasonably likely to see each other’s posts during
routine usage of the forum. On Facebook, communication in this
category occurs if the speaker and the target are Facebook friends,
but the speaker does not tag the target of the online post.80 Because
the speaker and the target are using the same forum (Facebook), it is
likely that the target would see the post herself. Additionally, if the
speaker and the target are both members of the same “Facebook
group,” it is likely that the target would see a post the speaker made
on that group’s page.81 And finally, on many forums—including
Facebook—the forum will send everyone who is tagged in a post or
has commented on that post a notification when a new comment
appears in the thread.82 This often widens the audience for new
comments, thus increasing the likelihood that users of the same forum
will see each other’s posts.
Other social networking websites that allow users to see one
another’s posts within the forum include LinkedIn,83 Twitter,84
Instagram,85 Vine,86 and Snapchat.87 In each of these forums, the
target is likely to see postings about himself because the speaker and
target are connected by their association through the social
networking website.
4. Category 4: Likely Discovery
Discovery-based communication does not require the speaker
and the target of a particular online post to be users of the same
forum. On Facebook, for example, the Likely Discovery category
would include situations in which the speaker and the target are not
Facebook friends. In such situations, Tagging communication could
80. See Tagging, supra note 66.
81. See Group Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/162866443847527/
[http://perma.cc/4QNH-JT9V].
82. See Mentioning People, supra note 73.
83. See LINKEDIN, supra note 79.
84. See FAQs about Following, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14019
[https://perma.cc/UZ4F-C24G].
85. See INSTAGRAM, supra note 76.
86. Getting Started, VINE, http://help.vine.co/about%20vine#channels [http://perma.cc
/52VU-7BFS ].
87. Viewing Snaps, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/a/view-snaps [https://perma
.cc/8UTX-KZJR].
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not occur because users have to be Facebook friends in order to tag
one another; therefore, the target could not receive an automatic alert
from the website about the speaker’s post.88 Likewise, the speaker
and target are not using the same forum because they are not
Facebook friends, making Mutual Forum communication impossible.
Nonetheless, the speaker might still know of or recklessly
disregard a substantial likelihood that the target would discover the
speech, enabling what we have dubbed “Likely Discovery”
communication. For example, if the speaker and the target have
mutual acquaintances in real life and the speaker is Facebook friends
with many of these real-life acquaintances, then the speaker may have
exhibited reckless disregard that the target would learn about the
communications. Indeed, even if the target did not use Facebook at
all, the post about the target could still fall into this category. As we
have previously noted, Facebook automatically sends notifications to
everyone who is tagged in or who has commented on a post when
anyone writes a new comment—this increases the audience for a
given comment and in some instances broadens the types of
communication that would fall into the category of Likely
Discovery.89
Another example of Likely Discovery communication could
occur if the speaker knows that the target has a Google alert on her
own name—perhaps because the target has written a blog post about
using Google alerts that the speaker has read—and the speaker still
chooses to post threatening comments about the target in a forum
that he knows a Google alert will pick up.90
Factors that indicate that the speaker knew or recklessly
disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target would discover the
communication include: the speaker knew that the target uses the
forum; the speaker knew that people close to the target use the
forum; the speaker knew that the target has a Google or mention

88. See Mentioning People, supra note 73.
89. See id. (“The person, Page or group you mention may get a notification, and the
post or comment will appear on their Timeline.”). While we use Facebook as an example,
other forums also employ somewhat similar notification systems. For the sake of time and
space, we will not list them all.
90. A Google alert sends an email notification any time that Google finds a new
posting about any selected topic on the Internet. If someone places a Google alert on their
name, it allows people to learn when content including their name is posted on the web.
See Create an Alert, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/alerts [http://perma.cc/WRU87FAR (dark archive)] (“Once your alert is set up, you’ll start getting emails any time we
find new search results for your keywords.”).
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alert on her own name;91 or the speaker could easily have learned that
the target frequents the comments section of a public forum such as a
public blog. The inquiry is not a mechanical one; the question is
simply whether, taking into account all the relevant circumstances,
the speaker knew of, or recklessly disregarded, a substantial
likelihood that the target would find out about the communication.
5. Category 5: Discovery in Fact
The Discovery in Fact category includes online speech or
behavior by the speaker that the target did in fact find out about, but
that does not fall into any of the first four categories. Speech in this
category might include public comments on a website that the
speaker has no reason to know the target reads, or posts on a social
networking forum that the speaker has no way of knowing the target
uses. It might include speech on the so-called “Darknet,” where many
sites are difficult to access and do not appear with a simple Internet
search.92 It might include speech on protected social media accounts
to which neither the target nor any of the target’s acquaintances have
access. That is, this category includes speech about the target that the
speaker would not have expected the target to learn about.
C.

“Communication”

In our view, the first four categories of speech we discuss in the
previous section—Direct, Tagging, Mutual Forum, and Likely
Discovery—should all qualify as communication for purposes of
cyberharassment statutes. The first two categories are relatively
straightforward. If a speaker sends a direct message to her target, no
matter whether she uses email, instant messaging, Twitter direct
messaging, and so forth, she demonstrates a desire to call the content
of the message to the target’s attention.93 Likewise, by tagging the
91. See id.
92. See Dean Walsh, A Beginner’s Guide to Exploring the Darknet, HUBPAGES,
http://electronician.hubpages.com/hub/A-Beginners-Guide-to-Exploring-the-Darknet (last
updated Apr. 18, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SEQ7-DXBL] (“The ‘Dark Web’ or ‘Darknet’ is
part of the Deep Web, because its contents are not accessible through search engines.”).
93. In Elonis, for instance, the defendant commented several times on his ex-sister-inlaw’s posts on Facebook. For example, when the sister posted: “Halloween costume
shopping with my niece and nephew should be interesting,” Elonis commented, “Tell
[their son] he should dress up as matricide for Halloween. I don’t know what his costume
would entail though. Maybe [Tara Elonis’s] head on a stick?” United States v. Elonis, 730
F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). Under our analysis, Elonis’s
posts would clearly qualify as communication, although after the Supreme Court’s
decision the prosecution would still need to prove an as-yet-to-be-determined mental
state. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (providing that the Court would
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target of a message, the speaker has taken affirmative steps to ensure
that the target receives the message. In both situations, the speaker’s
choice of medium clearly reveals a desire for the target to learn about
the message as well as the decision to convey the message in a way
that makes it likely that the target will in fact learn about the
message.
The third category—Mutual Forum Communication—should
also qualify as “communication” for purposes of statutes criminalizing
cyberharassment. While the speaker has not taken the same
affirmative steps to draw the communication to the target’s attention
as with person-to-person, or tagging communication, the choice of a
mutual forum in itself reveals the speaker’s intent and desire for the
target to learn of the speaker’s comments. That is: Why would a
speaker post something on Facebook or LinkedIn—knowing that the
target of the post also uses the same forum—unless the speaker
wanted the target to learn about the communication?
Likely Discovery should also qualify as communication. This is
the most attenuated means of communication, but we believe that it is
also culpable conduct. If the speaker knows that the target of the
communication reads a specific blog, has a Google alert on her name,
or has friends who will alert her to a Facebook post, then any post by
the speaker is likely a subtle way of drawing the target’s attention to
the communication. To exempt this category of communication would
be to provide an easy end-run around prosecution for speakers who
wish to torment or terrify their targets. The speaker could simply post
in such a way that they know the target would find about it—thereby
accomplishing the goal of disrupting the target’s life—yet could evade
prosecution by claiming that they used a public forum. This would be
the case regardless of whether they knew to a certainty that it was a
forum where the target would eventually discover the
communication. This fourth category of communication is the most
neglected by current statutes and judicial decisions, and as a result we
will focus many of our recommendations on the ways statutes should
be amended to include this category. To do so is to engage in the

await “a decision below” before deciding whether recklessness was a sufficient mental
state). Ultimately, the Court did not consider whether Elonis’s statements about injuring
patrons and employees of a local park, his estranged wife, police officers, a kindergarten
class, and an FBI agent were in fact “communications.” Id. at 2001, 2007–09. Instead, the
Court focused on the intent element of the cyberharassment statute. Id. at 2001, 2008
(“This statute requires that a communication be transmitted and that the communication
contain a threat. It does not specify that the defendant must have any mental state with
respect to these elements.”).
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essential task of ensuring that our statutes actually reflect the realities
of how people communicate on the Internet.
We do not believe that the final category of speech, Discovery In
Fact, should fall within the ambit of cyberharassment statutes. Such
speech occurs online but does not involve a situation in which the
speaker disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target would
learn of the communication. If the subject of a communication does in
fact learn about a communication—but the author of the
communication would not reasonably have anticipated that the
subject would do so—it does not evince the intent to disrupt the
subject’s life in the same manner as the other four modes of
communication.
If a speaker has a Tumblr,94 for example, that functions mainly as
a diary, and the Tumblr is not well-read (it is not followed by any
other Tumblrs, it has never received any reblogs,95 no one ever
comments on the Tumblr, and it appears very low in Google search
results as the result of limited activity on the page) then absent other
circumstances, the author of the Tumblr would not expect the subject
of a particular post to ever actually read the post.
A more difficult scenario occurs when a speaker does not know
that the target uses a mutual forum and the target then discovers a
post. In that case, the court would have to determine whether the
author recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the target would
discover the post. Factors outside of the actual mutual forum would
need to be considered to determine whether it was reasonable for the
target to learn of the post. Such factors may include: (1) whether the
target is an active user of other social networking sites; (2) whether
the friends or family of the target are active users of social networking
sites; (3) how often the author’s page is viewed; and (4) the target’s
age and access to the Internet. If the speaker did not disregard the
likelihood that the target would likely find out about the
communication, then this discovery in fact situation would not qualify
as communication.

94. Tumblr allows users to create their own blogs where they can post content such as
“text, photos, quotes, links, music, and videos.” About, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com
/about [http://perma.cc/8ARH-L5ZV].
95. A reblog occurs when one Tumblr posts material that has already appeared on
another Tumblr. See Blog Customization, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/docs/en/blog
_customization [https://perma.cc/D4CV-R7PE]. Using the Tumblr interface, this can be
accomplished at the touch of a button. See id. (“Just click on the avatar or the username of
the blog you’re interested in . . . . Scroll through its posts, like and reblog as you
please . . . .”).
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If, however, the target did in fact learn about the post, and then
experienced the disruption to his life that cyberharassment statutes
are designed to guard against, our definition of communication would
not result in finding criminal liability. We accept this result as an
unfortunate byproduct of the need to balance the importance of
effective cyberharassment statutes with the importance of not
convicting people for engaging in speech that they did not intend to
function as harassment, stalking, or bullying.
II. STATE CYBERCRIME LAW AND COMMUNICATION
This Part examines how communication is treated within our
current cyberharassment regime. We consider how “communication”
is statutorily defined and judicially interpreted by presenting original
empirical research, compiled in the Appendix.96 Specifically, we
survey cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes in all fifty states
and federal law, then summarize the ways that these statutes have
been interpreted by courts.
A. The Emerging Problem of Cyberharassment
Cyberharassment is a pervasive social problem. A recent poll
found that 73% of adults have witnessed someone else being harassed
online and 40% have personally experienced harassment.97 Twentyfive percent of people have seen someone physically threatened
online, and 8% have personally experienced physical threats over the
Internet.98 Eighteen percent have witnessed someone be stalked, and
8% had been stalked themselves.99 In total, 18% of people have been
the targets of “more severe” forms of harassment such as “being the
target of physical threats, harassment over a sustained period of time,
stalking, and sexual harassment.”100 In particular, young women aged
eighteen to twenty-four experience some of the more severe types of
harassment at disproportionately high levels: 26% of women in that
age range had been stalked online, and 25% had been the targets of
96. See infra Appendix.
97. MAEVE DUGGAN, ONLINE HARASSMENT 2 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org
/files/2014/10/PI_OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6K2-282L].
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2–3. “The U.S. Department of Justice statistics suggest that 850,000
American adults—mostly women—are targets of cyber-stalking each year, and 40 percent
of women have experienced dating violence delivered electronically.” Marlisse Silver
Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do About Online Harassment, ATLANTIC (Nov.
12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/what-the-law-can-andcant-do-about-online-harassment/382638/ [http://perma.cc/U7QW-Z2WQ].
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online sexual harassment.101 In addition, 6% of students aged twelve
to eighteen reported that they had been victims of cyberbullying.102
These statistics are matched by anecdotes that reveal the
problematic nature of cyberharassment as well as its pervasiveness,
especially—although not exclusively—for women. In early 2014,
Amanda Hess chronicled the experience of a number of women on
the Internet who had received threats of violence and other serious
harm, including her own experience with a man on Twitter who
threatened to decapitate her, and law enforcement’s lackluster
response.103 Since Hess’s article, a number of other people—mostly
women—have shared similar experiences.104 A particularly disturbing
manifestation has emerged recently in the form of GamerGate, in
which several prominent women in the gaming community received
threats of death and other violence.105 Indeed, one of the authors has
substantial experience with online harassment perpetrated by an
anonymous individual she never met.106 As Hess and others have
101. DUGGAN, supra note 97, at 3–4.
102. JILL DEVOE & CHRISTINA MURPHY, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING AND CYBER-BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2009
SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, at
tbl.1.1 (2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011336.pdf [http://perma.cc/GL7R-FYMJ].
103. Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PAC. STANDARD
(Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/women-arent-welcome-internet
-72170 [http://perma.cc/NJ7L-U73Z].
104. See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, Let’s Be Real: Online Harassment Isn’t ‘Virtual’ for Women,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 10, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/lets-be-real-online-harassment-isn-t-virtual-for-women [http://perma.cc/L5U9-4THV].
105. See, e.g., Jay Hathaway, What Is GamerGate, and Why? An Explainer for NonGeeks, GAWKER (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:20 AM), http://gawker.com/what-is-gamergate-andwhy-an-explainer-for-non-geeks-1642909080 [http://perma.cc/P9BD-V9UH]; Zoe Quinn, 5
Things I Learned as the Internet’s Most Hated Person, CRACKED (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www
.cracked.com/blog/5-things-i-learned-as-internets-most-hated-person/ [http://perma.cc/SJ5CE6YV]; Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in ‘Gamer Gate’
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/technology
/gamergate-women-video-game-threats-anita-sarkeesian.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc
/KD6V-RPHB (dark archive)]; Brianna Wu, No Skin Thick Enough: The Daily
Harassment of Women in the Game Industry, POLYGON (July 22, 2014, 11:36 AM),
http://www.polygon.com/2014/7/22/5926193/women-gaming-harassment [http://perma.cc
/LT2S-PC4B]; Brianna Wu, Why Gamer Gate Trolls Won’t Win, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 4,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2015/03/04/brianna-why-gamergate-trolls-wonwin/l2V0PjfDRSf4Fm6F40i9YM/story.html [http://perma.cc/9MF6-AM6C (dark archive)].
106. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Anonymity and Abuse, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Nov.
19, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/11/anonymity-abuse/ [http://perma
.cc/CYD7-D7DH]; Nancy Leong, Consequences and Conclusions, FEMINIST L.
PROFESSORS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/12/consequencesconclusions/ [http://perma.cc/MLS3-Y5RN]; Nancy Leong, Identity and Ideas, FEMINIST L.
PROFESSORS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/11/identityideas/ [http://perma.cc/2QWT-BLYG]; Nancy Leong, Privilege and Passivity, FEMINIST L.
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explained, online harassment has serious consequences, particularly
for women:
[N]o matter how hard we attempt to ignore it, this type of
gendered harassment—and the sheer volume of it—has severe
implications for women’s status on the Internet. Threats of
rape, death, and stalking can overpower our emotional
bandwidth, take up our time, and cost us money through legal
fees, online protection services, and missed wages.107
Given the seriousness of the harm caused by cyberharassment, an
effective legal response is especially important.
These personal stories have also provided powerful evidence
that, in general, law enforcement is poorly educated about online
harassment and ill-equipped to deal with most cyberharassment.108
Quantitative data show that cyberharassment is quite rarely
prosecuted—for example, Danielle Citron’s examination of
government data reveals only about twenty-five online threat
prosecutions per year109—and the host of recent threats against
several women made during GamerGate have yet to yield any
convictions as of the time this Article goes to print.110
Despite the pervasiveness of problematic online behavior, online
harassment that employs social media platforms is a new problem for
courts. There are only a few cases in which a victim has found success
in the courtroom, and these rare victories generally involve

PROFESSORS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/12/privileging/
[http://perma.cc/C7KQ-R2Z3].
107. Hess, supra note 103.
108. Id. (describing how even “larger law enforcement agencies have little capacity or
drive to investigate” cyberharassment crimes).
109. Danielle Citron, United States v. Elonis and the Rarity of Threat Prosecutions,
FORBES (Dec. 3, 2014, 12:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/03
/united-states-v-elonis-and-the-rarity-of-threat-prosecutions/ [http://perma.cc/RFA4EA3Z] (“There were on average 25 threat cases pursued to trial or plea a year for the past
six years.”).
110. Admittedly the failure to prosecute the people threatening victims such as
Sarkeesian, Wu, Quinn, and others is not solely attributable to existing laws. Much of the
harassment directed at them is clearly criminal under any definition, and the issue is with
tracking down the perpetrator electronically or, in some instances, simply getting law
enforcement to act. Other conduct, however, is more ambiguous, and both high-profile
targets like Sarkeesian, Wu, and Quinn as well as non-famous individuals would benefit
from clarification of legal elements including the one we address here—the meaning of
communication. See Caitlin Dewey, Why Is It Taking So Long To Identify the Anonymous
Gamergate Trolls?, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/the-intersect/wp/2014/10/17/why-is-it-taking-so-long-to-identify-the-anonymousgamergate-trolls/ [http://perma.cc/RK5V-82QX].
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particularly severe instances of harassment.111 The most common
form of harassment that courts have upheld as cyberharassment is the
public release of sexually explicit photographs and videos of the
victim.112 Courts might also find guilt where the harasser has released
the victim’s private information.113 It is rare that courts will find guilt
where there is only one instance of a harassing action or if that action
is not severe.114
Yet it should be noted that no matter how severe the harassment,
a court cannot take action if the statute is not properly constructed to
protect the victim. This can occur if a statute is found
unconstitutional,115 or—the problem that our Article addresses—if
the statute does not have a clear definition of what it means to
communicate. For example, in People v. Barber,116 the defendant
posted nude photos of his ex-girlfriend online and sent those photos

111. See, e.g., United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2014) (involving a
defendant who created a false Facebook account featuring sexually explicit photographs
of the victim, and sent emails to the victim’s co-workers and friends also containing
explicit photographs); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 428–29 (1st Cir. 2014)
(involving a defendant who made sexual Craigslist ads, MySpace accounts, and posted
sexual acts of the victim on pornography sites); People v. Kucharski, 987 N.E.2d 906, 910–
11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (involving a defendant who hacked his ex-girlfriend’s MySpace page
and posted a photo of her bending forward wearing only thong underwear and posted her
phone number and address).
112. See, e.g., Kucharski, 987 N.E.2d at 910–11 (involving a defendant who, after
hacking his ex-girlfriend’s MySpace page, posted sexually explicit photographs of her
along with her contact information).
113. See Greg Miller & David Maharaj, N. Hollywood Man Charged in 1st CyberStalking Case, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/22/news/mn523 [http://perma.cc/GDD5-KCKM]. In fact, the first cyberstalking conviction in
California was based on the release of personal information. Id. In that case, the
defendant “told numerous men everything from the address of [the victim’s] apartment to
her physical description, her phone number and how to bypass her home security system.”
Id.
114. As an example of one success, an Ohio court found a defendant guilty where she
had posted one comment that the victim “[m]olested a little boy.” State v. Ellison, 900
N.E.2d 228, 229–30 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Notably, Ohio had a very expansive
cyberharassment statute providing that “no person shall make or cause to be made a
telecommunication . . . with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.” Id. at
230 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21(B) (LEXIS through 2008 Reg. Sess.)).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 588 (D. Md. 2011)
(involving a defendant who had made a Twitter account and tweeted hundreds of
messages about the victim and was charged under the interstate stalking statute, which was
found to be an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech as applied to the
defendant); People v. Marquan, 19 N.E.3d 480, 484–86 (N.Y. 2014) (involving a defendant
who posted information about his classmates’ sexual practices on Facebook, but the court
held that the law was overbroad because it had “a wide array of applications that prohibit
types of protected speech far beyond the cyberbullying of children”).
116. No. 2013NY059761, 2014 WL 641316 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014).
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to her employer, entirely without her consent.117 New York, as a state
without a cyberharassment statute referencing online communication,
charged Barber with aggravated harassment in the second degree.118
While the court found Barber’s actions “reprehensible,” it was unable
to hold him accountable because the material was not “communicated
directly” with the victim.119 Ultimately, the court found it insufficient
that the victim saw that he had posted the photos online and had sent
the email to her employer.120
While statistics of cyberharassment trials, convictions, and pleas
are non-existent at worst and incomplete at best, it is universally
acknowledged that “[convictions are] a paltry number given the
estimated number of [cyberharassment] cases a year.”121 Both a cause
and a consequence of the lack of prosecution of cyberharassment is
that many important issues remain unaddressed by the courts. As a
result, law enforcement agencies may remain unsure of what
constitutes a crime and prosecutors may hesitate to press charges.
Consequently, a great deal of problematic online behavior remains
unpunished.122 One element notably lacking in clarity is the meaning
of “communication.” Using the categories designed in Part I as a
foundation, the subsequent sections of this Article address this
problem.
B.

Criminalizing Cyberharassment

In this Section, we evaluate the current treatment of
cyberharassment in criminal law. We first consider threshold issues of
constitutionality. We then present an original empirical survey of
state cyberharassment laws based on how communication is defined
in those statutes, and discuss the way that courts have interpreted
these statutes.

117. Id. at *2. This phenomenon has become known as “revenge porn,” where a person
will post sexually explicit photos or videos of his or her ex-significant other, intending to
publically humiliate them. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
118. Barber, 2014 WL 641316, at *1. Barber was also charged with two other offenses
that were dismissed on other grounds. Id. at *3–5, *7–9.
119. Id. at *1, *4.
120. Id. at *6 (“[The defendant] merely posted photographs to his Twitter account,
where Ms. Batch saw them, and sent them to other parties, who apparently showed them
to her.”).
121. Citron, supra note 109.
122. See Sweeney, supra note 100 (describing how a lack of on-point precedent and a
lack of police training contribute to less prosecution of online harassment).
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1. Constitutionality
Like all laws, cyberharassment statutes must survive
constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court maintains that “basic
principles of freedom of speech and press, like the First Amendment’s
command, do not vary when a new and different medium for
communication appears.”123 Nonetheless, the Court has also made
clear that developments in technology influence the appropriate
interpretation of constitutional rights.124 The First Amendment, then,
need not be intentionally blind to the way the Internet has changed
the way we interact with one another.
This constitutional backdrop makes clear that cyberharassment
can be criminalized via carefully drawn statutes. The Supreme Court
has consistently classified emotionally distressing or outrageous
speech as protected, especially where that speech touches on matters
of political, religious, or public concern.125 But speech integral to
criminal conduct is a long-established category of unprotected
speech.126 For example, “speech is not protected by the First
Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself” such as in
crimes of perjury, bribery, extortion and threats, and conspiracy.127
Likewise, when speech contains “true threats,” as the speech
criminalized by cyberharassment statutes often does, that speech is
also unprotected.128 Although the Supreme Court has never clearly
123. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
124. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (holding that police
may not execute a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to an arrest, and, more
generally, acknowledging evolving technology as a consideration in constitutional
analysis); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that law-enforcement use
of a thermal imaging camera in specific circumstances constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment); see also Nancy Leong, Constitutional Rights in the Digital Age,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancyleong/constitutional-rights-in-first-amendment_b_5601216.html
[http://perma.cc/UZ9DPMVH] (“The Court’s decision in Riley rested on a simple premise: Cell phones are
different from ordinary physical objects.”).
125. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (holding that speech relating to a public
issue even when causing emotional distress, such as picketing at a funeral, was protected
by the First Amendment).
126. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“It has rarely
been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute.”);
United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433–34 (1st Cir. 2014).
127. United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621
(1964)).
128. United States v. Watts, 349 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (“Nevertheless, a statute such
as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished
from what is constitutionally protected speech.”).
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defined what a true threat is, lower courts have adopted a variety of
tests.129
Challengers to cyberharassment statutes therefore raise two
primary arguments: (1) that the statute is void for vagueness; and (2)
that the statute is overbroad by punishing protected speech.130
Courts have declared criminal laws unconstitutionally vague
using two different approaches.131 First, the statute may be
unenforceable if it is too vague for the average citizen to understand
what conduct is criminalized.132 Second, a statute may fail to describe
explicit standards for when it applies, “thus authorizing or even
encouraging
arbitrary
and
discriminatory
enforcement.”133
Invalidating vague statutes avoids “punishing people for behavior
that they could not have known was illegal; . . . subjective
enforcement of laws based on arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by government officers; and . . . any chilling effect on the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms . . . .”134
When analyzing vagueness, courts apply a “practical rather than
hypertechnical” test.135 When the statute does not provide explicit
129. For example, some courts consider a series of factors in determining whether
speech constitutes a true threat, including: (1) the reaction of the recipient of the speech;
(2) “whether the threat was conditional”; (3) whether the speaker communicated the
speech directly to the recipient; (4) whether the speaker “had made similar statements” in
the past; and (5) whether the recipient “had reason to believe” the speaker could engage
in violence. Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 420 (2002) (quoting United States v. Dinwiddie,
76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (determining that a student’s rap song threatening
violence to another student was a true threat)). Other courts use a “reasonable person”
test, explaining: “[I]f a reasonable person would foresee that an objective rational
recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute a serious
expression . . . [then] the message conveys a ‘true threat.’ ” United States v. Miller, 115
F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Smith, 928 F.2d 740, 741 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 852 (1991)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 883 (1997).
130. See Sayer, 748 F.3d at 430 (stating that the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the cyberstalking statute as “overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment [and] unconstitutionally vague”).
131. People v. Kucharski, 987 N.E.2d 906, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“First, the statute
may fail to provide the kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinary intelligence
to understand what conduct is prohibited. Second, a statute may be declared
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply it, thus
authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (quoting
People v. Law, 782 N.E.2d 247, 249–50 (Ill. 2002))).
132. Id. (stating a statute may be void for vagueness if “the statute may fail to provide
the kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what
conduct is prohibited” (quoting Law, 782 N.E.2d at 249)).
133. Id. (quoting Law, 782 N.E.2d at 250).
134. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (third alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 2009)).
135. United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 310 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States
v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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standards of enforcement, “ordinary meaning and common sense”
determine whether the statute “conveys sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices.”136
Analysis of the federal cyberstalking statute demonstrates the
way these constitutional principles play out in practice.137 The statute
prohibits using “any interactive computer service . . . to engage in a
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress . . . .”138
The federal cyberstalking statute is not unconstitutionally vague
because it “provide[s] sufficient notice” of the “respective
prohibitions” and citizens “need not guess what terms such as ‘harass’
and ‘intimidate’ mean.”139 Further, the government is only required to
show that the totality of the defendant’s conduct “evidenced a
continuity of purpose” to achieve the criminal end.140
For example, in United States v. Osinger,141 the defendant’s
“threats, creation of a false Facebook page with sexually explicit
photographs” of the victim, and emails to the victim’s “co-workers
and friends containing explicit photographs evinced [an] ‘intent
to . . . cause substantial emotional distress . . . .’ ”142 Accordingly, the
court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because
the defendant “could . . . have known [his conduct] was illegal.”143
Complementing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Osinger, in Vines
v. City of New York,144 the Southern District of New York held that
statutes that criminalize intentional communication with the intent to
“annoy or alarm” are unconstitutional on both freedom of speech and
vagueness grounds.145 The court noted that other courts had found
136. Id. (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 380 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1182
(2005); see 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (providing for criminal liability when the person acts “with
intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person”); United States v. Shepard, No.
12-10253, 2014 WL 2750117, at *1 (9th Cir. June 18, 2014) (mem.); Osinger, 753 F.3d at
944–45; United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 436 (1st Cir. 2014); People v. Sucic, 928
N.E.2d 1231, 1242–44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
140. Shrader, 675 F.3d at 311 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2) (2012)). Additionally, “the
statute does not impose a requirement that the government prove that each act was
intended in isolation to cause serious distress or fear of bodily injury to the victim.” Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2) (2012)).
141. 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014).
142. Id. at 945 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012)).
143. Id. (quoting United States v. Killbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1256 (9th Cir. 2009)).
144. 305 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
145. See id. at 295, 300–02 (“[The statute] is therefore unconstitutional to the extent it
prohibits communications, made with the intent to annoy or alarm . . . .”). New York State
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that determining what language would classify as to “annoy or alarm”
was too vague of a determination because it would depend on the
person receiving the communication.146
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[a]ny vagueness
associated with the word ‘annoy’ [is] mitigated by the fact that the
meanings of ‘threaten’ and ‘harass’ can easily be ascertained and have
generally accepted meanings.”147 Thus, the court “suggests that the
words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be read together to be
given similar meanings.”148
The Supreme Court has not addressed this specific language
issue. Lower courts, however, have either taken the inclusion
approach or have simply read the word “annoy” out of the statute,
holding that the remainder is sufficiently specific to survive
scrutiny.149
A criminal law may violate the First Amendment if it restricts
general speech that is not a “true threat”150 or “fighting words.”151 But
the federal cyberstalking statute does not prohibit protected speech
because it is the conduct rather than the speech that is prohibited.152
The conduct governed by cyberharassment statutes is not protected
by the First Amendment153 because the statutes only prohibit conduct

courts have similarly held. See People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805, 813–14 (N.Y. 2014) (“[W]e
conclude that [the statute] is unconstitutional under both the State and Federal
Constitutions, and we vacate defendant’s convictions on these counts.”).
146. See Vines, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 300–01 (citing People v. Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169,
176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)). Additionally, the court found intent to “annoy or alarm” to be
protected under the Constitution because communication that alarms or annoys does not
constitute fighting words or true threats and, therefore, that the speech at issue was “fully
protected speech that may not be proscribed or punished.” Id. at 299–300 (citing Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)) (“[The defendant’s] communications do not fall into
one of the defined categories of unprotected speech . . . [accordingly] such communications
are fully protected speech that may not be proscribed or punished.” (citations omitted)).
147. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 383 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Staley v. Jones,
239 F.3d 769, 791–92 (6th Cir. 2001)), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005)
(mem.).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., id. at 382–83 (“[T]he words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be
read together to be given similar meanings.”).
150. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
151. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012) (providing criminal liability for those who “place [a
target] under surveillance” or “place a person . . . in reasonable fear of death, or serious
bodily injury”); see also State v. Hemmingway, 825 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012)
(“[I]ntimidating conduct serves no legitimate purpose and merits no First Amendment
protection.”).
153. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2004).
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with both “malicious intent on the part of the defendant and
substantial harm” to the target.154
The federal cyberstalking statute specifically criminalizes “a
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress”155 and
provides: “[t]he term ‘course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct
composed of two or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.”156
Thus, the requirement of two or more acts relates to the criminalized
conduct rather than the speech itself.157 The element of threatening
intent also clarifies what speech the cyberharassment statute
prohibits.158 Therefore, the threat element narrows the punishable
behavior “such that the defendant must ‘knowingly and without
lawful justification’ specifically intend to ‘harass’ the [target] by
transmitting the threat.”159
Only one federal district court has held that the indictment of a
defendant under the federal cyberstalking statute violated the First
Amendment.160 In United States v. Cassidy,161 the prosecution indicted
an individual for tweets and blog posts that were critical of a “wellknown religious figure” and that questioned the subject’s “character
and qualifications as a religious leader.”162 In the specific context of
the particular indictment, the court held that the indictment violated
the First Amendment, but explicitly declined to consider whether the
cyberstalking statute was facially invalid.163
Thus, cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes can be drafted
in a manner that complies with the requirements of the First
Amendment. And, in general, the federal courts have found that the
federal cyberstalking statute is drafted in such a way.

154. United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2261(2)(A) (2012)).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B)(iii).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2266(2) (2012).
157. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014).
158. People v. Sucic, 928 N.E.2d 1231, 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). Threats are not
protected under the First Amendment. See id. (“Therefore, the element of speech in the
cyberstalking statute, the threat, does not fall within the protections of the First
Amendment.”).
159. Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West 2008)).
160. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 587–88 (D. Md. 2011) (“In this case,
the Court concludes that the statute is unconstitutional as applied . . . .”).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 583.
163. Id. at 587–88 (“In this case, the Court concludes that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied, and thus it is unnecessary to address the parties’ arguments as
to whether . . . [the statute] is facially invalid.”).
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2. Statutory Definitions of Communication
This Section examines how cyberharassment statutes currently
define “communication.” All cyberharassment statutes have three
elements: intentional mens rea with respect to the making of the
communication, threatening or harassing communication, and the
victim’s knowledge of the communication. We divided the current
statutes into five categories based on how communication is
statutorily defined. A chart containing all the statutes is appended to
this Article.164
a.

Category 1: No Reference to Online Communication

Some states do not refer to online communication in any criminal
statutes. This is true in six states: Delaware, Maine, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, and New York.165
b.

Category 2: Undefined “Electronic Communication”

Sixteen states—Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia—criminalize
threatening “electronic communication,” but do not define electronic
communication.166 Of these statutes, only Florida, Rhode Island, and
Virginia have separate “Cyberstalking” or “Harassment by
Computer” statutes.167 All other states in Category 2 include
electronic communication within the “Harassment” or “Stalking”
statute.168

164. See infra Appendix.
165. Westlaw searches for various categories of “online communication” returned no
results for these states.
166. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 499); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.270 (LEXIS through 2015 legislation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-182b (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 711-1106 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 18-7906 (LEXIS through
2015 Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.);
IOWA CODE § 708.7 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. 2015); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 565.225 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220
(West, Westlaw through July 2015 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (LEXIS through
2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (LEXIS through Jan. 2015 Sess.);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (LEXIS through 2015 Gen. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027
(LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (2014).
167. FLA. STAT. § 784.048; 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2152.7:1.
168. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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Category 3: Statutorily Specified Communication

Nine states—Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia—
criminalize and define threatening “electronic communication” with
an inclusive list of ways to electronically communicate.169 However,
these statutes omit many types of communication in their definitions.
For example, Arizona defines electronic communication as only “a
wire line, cable, wireless or cellular telephone call, a text message, an
instant message or electronic mail.”170
d.

Category 4: All Direct Victim Communication

Twelve states—California, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee,
Texas, and Wyoming—and federal law define threatening
communication to include all types of communication, but require
that the threatening language be directed at a particular target.171
Interpretation of the statutory language “directed at a person” varies
from state to state.
For example, Louisiana defines electronic communication as
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part by wire,
radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical
system.”172 The statute defines electronic mail as “use of the Internet,
a computer, a facsimile machine, a pager, a cellular telephone, a video

169. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90
(2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508.130 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Spec. Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 61-3C-14a (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.).
170. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916(E).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 2010); LA. STAT.
ANN. § 14:40.3 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 3-805 (LEXIS through 2015 Legis. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211
(LEXIS through 2015 legislation); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1172 (West, Westlaw through
2015 1st Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.065 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308 (Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (LEXIS through
2015 Legis. Sess.).
172. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3(1).
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recorder, or other electronic means . . . .”173 This communication must,
however, be “sent to a person identified by a unique address or
address number and received by that person.”174
Other state statutes take similar approaches. For example,
Mississippi criminalizes all types of electronic mail or electronic
communication with “another, repeatedly, whether or not
conversation ensues.”175 Similarly, in its stalking statute, Wyoming
criminalizes “[c]ommunicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing
a communication with another person by verbal, electronic,
mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means”176 when those
communications are “directed at a specific person.”177
e. Category 5: Reasonable Victim’s Knowledge of
Communication
Seven states—Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
South Carolina, and Wisconsin—have stalking or harassment statutes
that do not require a statement to be made directly to the person.178
Instead, they criminalize any statement made that would cause a
reasonable recipient to feel threatened.179 For example, Nevada
criminalizes any “display or distribut[ion] of information in a manner
that substantially increases the risk of harm or violence to the
victim.”180 Similarly, although Minnesota does not have a separate
cyberstalking statute, the general stalking statute criminalizes “any
communication made through any available technologies”181 that “the
actor knows or has reason to know would cause the victim under the

173. Id. § 14:40.3(2).
174. Id.
175. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15(b).
176. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(b)(i).
177. Id. § 6-2-506(a) (emphasis added).
178. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.749 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575
(West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700 (Supp. 2014); WIS.
STAT. § 947.0125 (2015).
179. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700(C) (“ ‘Stalking’ means a pattern of
words . . . intended to cause and does cause a targeted person and would cause a
reasonable person in the targeted person’s position to fear [harm].”). Category 5 differs
from Category 1 in the following ways: the states in Category 1 do not have online
communication within their criminal statutes, and the state statutes in Category 5
explicitly include language about online communication. See supra notes 165, 178 and
accompanying text.
180. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575.
181. MINN. STAT. § 609.749(1b)(b).

94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015)

2015]

COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE

139

circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted,
or intimidated.”182
3. Judicial Definitions of Communication
This Section explains how courts have defined the term
“communication” in cases involving online behavior. Just as different
cyberstalking statutes define communication differently, case law
defining communication varies based on the statutory requirements.
All of the courts that have considered the issue have held that
emails sent to the target satisfy the requirement of direct
communication with the victim.183 Moreover, an Internet message can
be a “true threat” not protected by the First Amendment, even
without being sent directly to the victim.184
In New York, a state trial court went a step further and held that
messages in a newsgroup, similar to a blog, also qualify as a direct
communication. In People v. Munn,185 the defendant posted a
message asking readers to kill a police sergeant and all other
members of the NYPD.186 The message was in a “newsgroup,” posted
daily and read by a group of regular participants, but open to be read
by anyone with a computer and online capabilities.187 The court found
that defendant’s posting on an Internet newsgroup “with the
complainant’s name . . . transformed the communication to one not
only intended for the general public, but specially generated to be
communicated to the complainant.”188 Therefore, the court
determined that communications in a public newsgroup message

182. Id. § 609.749(1).
183. See United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 374, 388 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on
other grounds, 543 U.S. 1182 (2005) (mem.); People v. Munn, 688 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385–86
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999); M.G. v. C.G., No. O-00000-00, 2008 WL 1869738, at *3 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. Apr. 28, 2008); Barson v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 292, 294 (Va. 2012). Florida,
however, has held that changing an email password and appropriating emails is not
cyberstalking because it is not electronic communication directed at the victim, as required
by the statute. Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478, 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
184. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015) (“Here ‘the crucial
element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct’ is the threatening nature of
the communication. The mental state requirement must therefore apply to the fact that the
communication contains a threat.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994))); People v. Diomedes, 13 N.E.3d 125, 135 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014) (“However, the first amendment permits restrictions on some forms of speech,
including ‘true threats’ . . . .”).
185. 688 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999).
186. Id. at 385.
187. Id. at 386 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850–51 (1997)).
188. Id.
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qualified as written communication directed at the person for
purposes of harassment.189
But other courts’ failure to use a definition of communication
that reflects the way people actually use the Internet results in missed
opportunities to convict individuals who have clearly engaged in
online behavior that terrorized their victims.
In State v. Ellison,190 for example, the defendant posted a picture
of the target to MySpace with a caption stating that the target “liked
to molest little boys.”191 The MySpace post was available to the public
but not sent directly to the target.192 The relevant Ohio statute
prohibited “telecommunication . . . with [the] purpose to abuse,
threaten, or harass another person,”193 and the trial court convicted
the defendant of “telecommunications harassment.”194
On appeal, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that
“the statute creates a specific-intent crime: the state must prove the
defendant’s specific purpose to harass.”195 The court held that direct
contact with the target was not necessary, but that the state must
prove the intent of the defendant was to harass the target.196 The
defendant claimed, and the court agreed, that the intent of the
defendant was to warn the public of the target’s character and not to
harass the target.197 The court reversed the conviction.198
Ellison reveals a misplaced focus on the intent of the defendant
rather than—in keeping with the purpose of cyberharassment statutes
in general, which is to avoid disruption and fear in innocent citizens’
lives—a focus on whether a threatening or severely distressing
message was communicated to the target. Such communication
should be the focus. After all, the point of cyberharassment statutes is
to prevent the harms arising from such communication.

189. Id.
190. 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
191. Id. at 229.
192. Id. (“Ellison allowed for public, rather than private, viewing of her MySpace
page.”).
193. Id. at 230.
194. Id. at 229–30.
195. Id. at 230.
196. Id. at 230–31 (“[W]e decline to hold that a direct contact is required to establish a
telecommunication under the statute.”).
197. Id. at 231 (“Thus, we hold that the state failed to establish that Ellison had made a
telecommunication with the purpose to harass, where she had a legitimate purpose for
posting the accusation against [the target] on the Internet, and where Ellison did not
directly telecommunicate with [the target].”).
198. Id.
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By way of further example, prosecutors have simply declined to
press charges because of the inadequacy of statutory tools at their
disposal. In September of 2006, Lori Drew became concerned that
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old neighbor, was spreading rumors
about her daughter.199 Drew created a false MySpace account in the
name of “Josh Evans.”200 Drew used the MySpace account to pretend
to be a sixteen-year-old boy and to flirt with Meier.201 “Josh Evans”
began sending Meier negative messages on October 15, 2006, and
continued throughout the next day.202 On October 16, “Josh Evans”
sent Meier a message stating that “[t]he world would be a better place
without you.”203 Additional MySpace members whose profiles
reflected links with the “Josh Evans” profile also began to send Meier
disparaging messages.204 Subsequently, Meier’s mother discovered
that her daughter had hanged herself in her bedroom closet.205
Missouri prosecutors did not press charges because they could not
prove Drew intended to cause emotional distress.206 Yet again, this
focus is misplaced. The disruption to Meier’s life is the harm that the
statute is intended to prevent, and consequently the prosecution
should focus on the nature of the communication.207

199. Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Who Posed as Boy Testifies in Case that Ended in
Suicide of 13-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21
/us/21myspace.html?fta=y [http://perma.cc/CA83-L7XA (dark archive)].
200. The Story of Megan Meier, MEGAN MEIER FOUND., http://www
.meganmeierfoundation.org/megans-story.html [http://perma.cc/LRL3-HU97] [hereinafter
Megan Meier].
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id. (“ ‘They are posting bulletins about me’ . . . [saying] ‘Megan Meier is a slut.
Megan Meir is fat.’ ”).
205. Id.
206. Prosecutor: No Criminal Charges in MySpace Suicide, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/03/prosecutor-no-criminal-charges-in-myspacesuicide/ [http://perma.cc/YF8H-EL9N?type=live].
207. A similar example of unprosecuted cyberharassment occurred in Tampa, Florida
in 2012. There, an ex-mistress, Paula Broadwell, sent anonymous threatening emails to the
wife of David Petraeus, with whom she had an affair. Matthew Lysiak, Menacing Emails
Sent by David Petraeus’ Ex-Mistress Paula Broadwell to Socialite Jill Kelley Promised to
Make the Apparent Rival ‘Go Away’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2012, 2:30 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/broadwell-emails-kelley-sinister-previouslyreported-article-1.1204956 [http://perma.cc/CPW8-9QZ3 (dark archive)]. In the emails,
Broadwell touted her military background in a threatening manner and boasted of having
“powerful” friends. Id. The target saw the emails as death threats, specifically one in which
Broadwell vowed to “make [her] go away.” Id. But prosecutors never filed charges, again,
because of the focus on intent rather than the focus on communication and the disruption
it causes. See Pete Williams, Paula Broadwell Won’t Face Cyberstalking Charges in
Petraeus Scandal, NBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://investigations.nbcnews
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Finally, the recent passage of statutes that strive to criminalize
the phenomenon known as “revenge porn” also reveal the
deficiencies in current cyberharassment statutes.208 Revenge porn—
more accurately known as “non-consensual pornography”—consists
of online posting of nude pictures of another person without that
person’s consent.209 Often, although not always, the person who posts
the pictures is an angry ex-partner.210 Some websites exist solely for
the purpose of posting non-consensual pornography.211 Posting such
pictures is often a mechanism of communication. For example, the
website MyEx.com invites users to post links to the email address,
phone number, Facebook page, LinkedIn page, and other
information of people depicted in uploaded photos.212 Therefore,
other users can send threatening and harassing messages to the
person depicted in the photos, with the result that the person depicted
would find out about the pictures and potentially realize who
uploaded them. It is difficult to imagine a clearer way to communicate
hatred or contempt to the person depicted in the photos. But such
activity would not be covered under most of the aforementioned
statutory schemes. Thus, the example of non-consensual pornography
reveals the shortcomings of cyberharassment statutes as a tool to
address many forms of online abuse.
III. UPDATING THE MEANING OF “COMMUNICATION”
lack

This Part first briefly articulates the problems associated with the
of a clear and up-to-date statutory definition of

.com/_news/2012/12/18/15995676-paula-broadwell-wont-face-cyberstalking-charges-inpetraeus-scandal [http://perma.cc/XQM3-25D6].
208. Citron & Franks, supra note 117, at 346.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., MyEx.com Get Revenge! Naked Pics of Your Ex, MYEX.COM, http://
www.myex.com [http://perma.cc/L8DL-SP4A]. Another popular site, IsAnybodyUp.com,
averaged thirty million views a month at its peak. Daniel Kreps, Revenge-Porn Site Owner
Hunter Moore Pleads Guilty, Faces Prison Time, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/revenge-porn-site-owner-hunter-moore-pleadsguilty-faces-prison-time-20150220 [http://perma.cc/YFG8-XKY2]. IsAnybodyUp.com shut
down in 2012 because of intense public pressure. Id. Note that while the website founder
was indicted and eventually pled guilty, it was not on charges related specifically to the
protection of revenge-porn victims, “as many states’ cyber-laws still haven’t been
revamped to confront the relatively new phenomenon.” Jessica Roy, Revenge-Porn King
Hunter Moore, the ‘Most Hated Man on the Internet,’ Is Going to Jail, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 19,
2015, 1:34 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/02/revenge-porn-hunter-moorejail.html [http://perma.cc/ELN9-WX77].
212. See Submit Pics and Stories of Your Ex, MYEX.COM, http://www.myex.com/addyour-ex/ [http://perma.cc/3MRT-D2CN].
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“communication.” It then proposes a definition that can be used by
both legislatures and courts, and finally, offers concrete examples that
demonstrate why this definition is sensible.
A. Statutory Proposal
As we have explained, the myriad ways that people interact on
the Internet requires a careful and precise definition of
“communication” in cyberharassment statutes.213 As we have argued,
such a definition should include any form of online behavior where a
reasonable person knew or recklessly disregarded a reasonable
likelihood that the target would learn about the behavior.214
Currently, many cyberharassment statutes—including the federal
statute—define cyberharassment by focusing on the use of an
electronic communications device to engage in a “course of
conduct.”215 We think that altering the federal statute and others like
it to criminalize communication that focuses on the interaction
between the speaker and the target is more effective and realistic in
light of changing technology.
We propose the following language to describe the interaction
between the speaker and the target:
An individual commits the crime of cyberharassment when
he or she knowingly and repeatedly engages in online
communication about the target in a manner that a
reasonable person would find threatening or in a manner
that would cause a reasonable person severe emotional
distress, and that the target did in fact find threatening or
severely emotionally distressing.
(a) “Communication” is defined as speech or conduct using
any electronic medium when the individual knew or
recklessly disregarded a substantial likelihood that the
target would learn about the speech or conduct;
(b) “Repeatedly” means more than once.
The first part of the statute closely tracks the language in existing
cyberharassment statutes whose constitutionality courts have

213. See supra Section I.C.
214. See supra Part I.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(B)(iii) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.270 (LEXIS through
2015 legislation); FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805
(LEXIS through 2015 Legis. Sess.).
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upheld.216 By requiring that the speech is either threatening or
severely emotionally distressing, the statute avoids criminalizing
speech that is merely annoying or disparaging. Thus, this language
focuses on speech whose prohibition, as Justice O’Connor articulated
in Virginia v. Black,217 “ ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition to
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur.’ ”218
Key to our project is subsection (a), which defines
communication. We employ a definition that includes only speech or
conduct when the perpetrator either knew there was a substantial
likelihood that the target would find out about the speech or conduct
or recklessly disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target
would find out about the speech. This definition goes to the heart of
the harms caused by threatening or distressing communications on
the Internet. If the perpetrator knows or disregards a substantial
likelihood that the target will find out about a particular instance of
online behavior, the behavior is closely akin to the type of direct
communication (e.g., letters or phone calls) that were criminalized in
the pre-Internet world. In the next Section, we explain how our
statute—and its careful and precise definition of communication—will
apply to a range of behavior on the Internet.
B.

Examples

Finally, we turn to the task of articulating how our proposed
definition of communication would play out in the context of several
examples spanning a range of social media platforms. In each
instance, we demonstrate that the speaker knew or recklessly
disregarded the reasonable likelihood that the subject would learn of
the speech and, therefore, that the activity should count as
communication. We demonstrate not only that the test works across
existing platforms but also that it can accommodate new platforms as
well.

216. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
217. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
218. Id. at 359–60 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
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Example 1: Allison is Facebook friends with Brenda. Allison
writes a post about Brenda on Facebook that is visible to all of
Allison’s Facebook friends.
This example qualifies as communication under our definition.
Even if Allison does not tag Brenda in the post, people often see their
friends’ posts on Facebook while browsing their own news feeds—the
average American now spends forty minutes per day on Facebook,219
and some check far more frequently.220 Additionally, Allison and
Brenda’s mutual friends would likely inform Brenda of the post, or
ask her questions about it if the post was at all interesting or
salacious. In the unlikely event that Allison believed that Brenda
would not find out about the post, Allison would have had to
recklessly disregard the amount of time and how most people use
Facebook as well as the likelihood that mutual friends would alert
Brenda of the post’s existence. A post made with such reckless
disregard should qualify as communication.
Example 2: Cesar and Dave are not Facebook friends, but they
have many mutual Facebook friends. Cesar and Dave attend the
same high school. Cesar writes a post about Dave.
Under our proposed statutory language, this example likewise
qualifies as communication. Even though Dave may never see the
Facebook post himself, the many mutual friends of Cesar and Dave
make it likely that Dave would find out about the post. On Facebook,
it is easy to tell how many mutual friends one shares with another
person, regardless of whether one is friends with that person.221 Thus,
Cesar would have to recklessly disregard the readily available
information that he and Dave had multiple mutual friends in order to

219. Joshua Brustein, Americans Now Spend More Time on Facebook than They Do on
Their Pets, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-0723/heres-how-much-time-people-spend-on-facebook-daily [http://perma.cc/6FR3-A6XN].
220. Stephen Marche, Is Facebook Making Us Lonely?, ATLANTIC (May 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/05/is-facebook-making-uslonely/308930/ [http://perma.cc/VXT4-X5ND] (“Among 18-to-34-year-olds, nearly half
check Facebook minutes after waking up, and 28 percent do so before getting out of
bed.”).
221. See People You May Know, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help
/501283333222485/ [https://perma.cc/AQF8-VGBF].
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believe that none of the mutual friends would alert the subject to the
communication.
Example 3: Ed writes one post about Frida on Reddit.
Reddit is a website that bills itself as “the front page of the
Internet.”222 It is divided into a large number of forums, all of which
are publicly accessible and in any of which anyone can write a post of
any length.223 The site constantly updates itself, making certain
content more or less visible depending on the number of views the
content has received and the time since the posting.224 All posts are
publicly available until the post is removed by their creators.225
If Ed writes one post about Frida on Reddit, his post should not
qualify as communication because it is a single incident and Frida is
unlikely to find out about it. If the isolated post is the only thing Ed
has ever written about Frida, neither Frida nor people close to her
would have any reason to be on alert for a posting about her. Further,
if Ed’s post was the only thing he had written about Frida, it is
unlikely that even if someone close to Frida saw the blog that they
would tell her about it. And perhaps most importantly, Reddit
contains an enormous amount of ever-changing information. Absent
unusual circumstances not present in our hypothetical, the post about
Frida would not become prominent. In this instance, Ed has not
recklessly disregarded a reasonable likelihood that Frida would find
out about the Reddit post.
Example 4: Gary creates a blog dedicated to writing disparaging
and threatening posts about Holden.
Anyone with access to the Internet can create a blog. While some
blogs cost money to create and maintain, many platforms, such as
Tumblr, Blogspot, and Blogger, allow people to create blogs for
free.226 The settings on a particular blog may allow comments from
222. Reddit: The Front Page of the Internet, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com
[http://perma.cc/SE5T-SSY7].
223. Can Anyone Post on Reddit?, REDDIT, https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-us
/articles/205166565-Can-anyone-post-on-Reddit- [https://perma.cc/VK4V-4HDM].
224. See What is Reddit?, REDDIT, https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/204511479
-What-is-Reddit- [http://perma.cc/637Q-KKZF].
225. See id.
226. See, e.g., TUMBLR, supra note 94.
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viewers, or the blog may exist only as a forum for the author of the
blog. While blogs may be public or private, a public blog can be
viewed by anyone and the posts are available until they are taken
down by the owner of the blog.
A blog dedicated to negative commentary about Holden should
qualify as communication so long as the blog is public. If the blog is
public, it is likely that someone who knows Holden may see the blog
since the posts remain online until the author takes them down.
Additionally, most people “Google” themselves occasionally in order
to know what is on the Internet about them.227 Some even have
Google or mention alerts on their names.228 And others, such as
potential dates229 or potential employers,230 also Google people. Given
all of these possible avenues for learning about the blog via Internet
searches, Gary’s creation of the blog about Holden should qualify as
communication because it is reasonably likely that Holden would find
out about the blog.
Example 5: Ida creates a Craigslist ad that includes Jaliah’s
phone number and address and states that Jaliah is willing to
have sex for money.
Craigslist is a website that allows anyone to post an ad that is
made available to the public online.231 The website categorizes the
227. Majority of Online Americans ‘Google Themselves’, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/27/majority-of-online-americans-googlethemselves/ [http://perma.cc/LJ37-S53Z] (finding that as of 2013, fifty-six percent of
Americans admit to Googling themselves online).
228. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Please, I Beg You, Put a Google Alert on Your Name,
FORBES (Sept. 18, 2009, 11:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2009/09/18
/google-alerts/ [http://perma.cc/MJ3K-TJUT] (explaining the importance of Google
alerts).
229. See Roy Uphold, Why You Should Never Google Someone Before a First Date
(Video), ELITE DAILY (June 4, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://elitedaily.com/women/never-admitgoogle-person-first-date/1051472/ [http://perma.cc/5D2R-D3GR] (cautioning against Googling
someone before a date as a universal experience); see also Joanna Person, So, Tell Me
Everything I Know About You, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/09/14/fashion/14love.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& [http://perma.cc/4JLY-YX74
(dark
archive)] (describing humorous repercussions of Googling someone before a date).
230. Susan P. Joyce, What 80% of Employers Do Before Inviting You for an Interview,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2015, 7:45 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-pjoyce/job-search-tips_b_4834361.html [http://perma.cc/SLV3-N2KN] (showing that eighty
percent of employers Google potential employees).
231. Craigslist is a website of “[l]ocal classifieds and forums—community moderated,
and largely free.” About, CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/ [https://perma.cc
/4A9P-N8BX].
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postings by topic, such as “For Sale,” “Wanted,” “Housing,” “Casual
Encounters,” and so forth.232 The ads are visible to anyone on the
Internet, although in some instances they expire after a specified
length of time, such as a week.233 Posts often include contact
information for the party who has (supposedly) created the
advertisement.234
Ida’s Craigslist posting about Jaliah qualifies as communication.
The posting itself would solicit calls to Jaliah’s phone number and inperson visits to her address. As a result, Jaliah would likely find out
about the Craigslist posting even though she might not see it herself.
Ida’s posting of Jaliah’s contact information would establish Ida’s
knowledge of a reasonable likelihood that Jaliah would be contacted
and, therefore, that Jaliah would discover the posting.
Example 6: Keith and Leah both use Twitter. Keith writes several
public tweets about Leah threatening to harm her and her family.
He mentions Leah by her full name but does not include her
Twitter handle. Keith and Leah each have about five-hundred
Twitter followers, but they do not have any Twitter followers in
common.
While this is a close case, we believe that this example should
qualify as communication. Admittedly Keith has not used the “@”
symbol to call Leah’s attention to his tweets, and the lack of mutual
followers diminishes the likelihood that anyone will mention the
tweets to Leah. With that said, there are a number of ways that Leah
could find out about the tweets, such that she is reasonably likely to
do so. Given that the tweets are public, Leah could find the tweets by
Googling her name.235 She could also find them by using Twitter’s
search function to search for her name.236 Because the tweets are
threatening, it is possible that one of Keith’s Twitter followers would
reach out to Leah and alert her to the tweets. And, as in Example 4,

232. See id.
233. See Expirations by Posting Type, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help
/posting_lifespans [https://perma.cc/M4AZ-V2KU].
234. See How to Post, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/help/how_to_post
[http://perma.cc/L9NC-ADYR].
235. See Hill, supra note 228.
236. One can do this simply by typing a user’s name or Twitter handle into the search
bar within Twitter. See Using Twitter Search, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles
/132700# [http://perma.cc/B7G9-Z7EC].
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another person might Google Leah’s name, find the tweets, and let
Leah know the tweets exist.
Example 7: Mike creates a Snapchat video threatening Nick.
Mike is not friends with Nick or any people who know Nick.
Snapchat is a cell phone application that allows users to post
photos and videos within the application.237 Other users who also have
the application can view the videos and photos of people from their
phone contact list.238 In order to view a user’s Snapchat photo or
video, a person must have the phone number and be accepted as a
friend by the person who posts the video.239 All photos and videos are
available, at most, for 24 hours from the time of posting.240 Each
photo or video may be viewed multiple times within the allotted time
period.241
The Snapchat video should not qualify as communication. First,
Nick would be very unlikely to see the video himself. Because
Snapchat users are friends through cell phone numbers, the only
people that would have access to the Snapchat video would be Mike’s
close friends who have his cell phone number. Here, Mike has not
accepted Nick or any of Nick’s friends to be able to view his Snapchat
photos or videos. Additionally, Snapchat videos expire and are
inaccessible after twenty-four hours. This further decreases the
likelihood that Nick will find out about the video. Thus, this should
not qualify as communication. Indeed, even if Nick did in fact find out
about the video through some unusual set of circumstances, Mike did
not disregard a reasonable likelihood that he would do so, and thus
the test for communication is not satisfied.
CONCLUSION
New technology creates new ways of interacting and requires a
more robust definition of communication. Here, we have established
a definition of communication that addresses existing means of online

237. Elyse Betters, What’s the Point of Snapchat, and How Does it Work?, POCKET-LINT
(JAN. 29, 2015), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/131313-what-s-the-point-of-snapchat-andhow-does-it-work [http://perma.cc/R9MC-KEWS].
238. Snapchat allows users to send photos directly to another user by using their
phone’s contacts or by entering a username. SNAPCHAT, supra note 71.
239. Betters, supra note 237.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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interaction and can adapt to new ones. Incorporating this definition of
communication into statutes criminalizing cyberharassment will
improve the efficacy of those statutes at detecting and punishing
problematic online behavior that rises to a level that society deems
worthy of criminal sanction.
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APPENDIX
Jurisdiction

Category

Communication Language

Alabama

2

“[I]nitiates communication,
verbally, electronically, or
otherwise . . . .”

Alaska

2

“[S]ending mail or electronic
communications to that
person; . . . .”

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

3

5

“ ‘[E]lectronic
communication’ [including]
wire line, cable, wireless or
cellular telephone call, a text,
an instant message, or
electronic mail.”
Communication of any kind
made through “electronic
means” (cites local bulletin,
chat room, social media,
instant messaging).

Citation
ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-90.1
(West, Westlaw
through 2015 Act
499); ALA. CODE
§ 13A-11-8
(West, Westlaw
through 2015 Act
499)
ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.270
(LEXIS through
2015 legislation)
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2916
(West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st
Reg. Sess.)
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-71-217
(LEXIS through
2015 Reg. Sess.)

4

“[T]elephones, cellular
phones, computers, video
recorders, facsimile machines,
pagers, personal digital
assistants, smartphones, and
any other device that transfers
signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, or data.”

CAL. PENAL
CODE § 653m
(West 2010)

3

“[C]ommunication with a
person . . . anonymously or
otherwise, by telephone,
telephone network, data
network, text message, instant
message, computer, computer
network, [or] computer
system . . . .”

COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-9-111
(LEXIS through
2015 Reg. Sess.)
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Connecticut

2

Delaware

1

Federal

4

Florida

2

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

[Vol. 94

Communication Language

“[C]omputer network”

N/A
“[U]ses the mail, any
interactive computer service
or electronic communication
service or electronic
communication system of
interstate commerce . . . .”
“[M]eans to engage in a
course of conduct to
communicate, or to cause to
be communicated, words,
images, or language by or
through the use of electronic
mail or electronic
communication . . . .”

Citation
CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a182b (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.)
N/A

18 U.S.C.
§ 2261A (2012)

FLA. STAT.
§ 784.048 (Supp.
2015)

3

“[C]ommunication in person,
by telephone, by mail, by
broadcast, by computer, by
computer network, or by any
other electronic device; . . . .”

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-90 (2011)

2

“[T]elephone calls, facsimile
transmissions, or any form of
electronic communication . . .
including electronic mail
transmissions . . . .”

HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 711-1106
(LEXIS through
2015 Sess.)

2

“Sending mail or electronic
communications . . . .”

IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7906
(LEXIS through
2015 Sess.)
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Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas
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Category

Communication Language

Citation

5

“ ‘Electronic communication’
means any transfer of signs,
signals, writings, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photo-optical
system . . . [i]ncluding, but not
limited to, a telephone,
cellular phone, computer, or
pager, which communication
includes, but is not limited to,
e-mail, instant message, text
message, or voice mail.”

720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/127.5 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.)

2

“[U]ses a computer
network . . . .”

IND. CODE § 3545-2-2 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 First Reg.
Sess.)

2

“Communicates with another
by telephone, telegraph,
writing, or via electronic
communication . . . .”

IOWA CODE
§ 708.7 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.)

3

“[I]mpart a message by any
method of transmission,
including, but not limited to:
Telephoning, personally
delivering, sending or having
delivered, any information or
material by written or printed
note or letter, package, mail,
courier service or electronic
transmission, including
electronic transmissions
generated or communicated
via a computer; . . . .”

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5427 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Sess.)
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Kentucky
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Category

3

Communication Language
“[Use of] computers, the
Internet or other electronic
network, cameras or other
recording devices, telephones
or other personal
communications devices,
scanners or other copying
devices, and any device that
enables the use of a
transmitting device.”
“[A]ny transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature, transmitted in
whole or in part by wire,
radio, computer,
electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photo-optical
system . . . use of the Internet,
a computer, a facsimile
machine, a pager, a cellular
telephone, a video recorder,
or other electronic
means . . . .”

[Vol. 94

Citation

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508.130
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
Reg. Sess.)

LA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:40.3(A)(12) (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.)

Louisiana

4

Maine

1

N/A

N/A

4

“[T]ransmission of
information, data, or a
communication by the use of a
computer or any other
electronic means” such as
“information service, system,
or access software provider
that provides or enables
computer access by multiple
users to a computer server,
including a system that
provides access to the Internet
and cellular phones.”

MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3805 (LEXIS
through 2015
Legis. Sess.)

Maryland
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Category

Communication Language

Citation

4

“[C]onduct, acts or threats
conducted by mail or by use of
a telephonic or
telecommunication device or
electronic communication
device including, but not
limited to, any device that
transfers signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical
system, including, but not
limited to, electronic mail,
internet communications,
instant messages or facsimile
communications.”

MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 265,
§ 43 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Legis.
Sess.)

5

“[A]ny medium of
communication, including the
internet or a computer,
computer program, computer
system, or computer network,
or other electronic medium of
communication . . . .”

MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.
§ 750.411s (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.)

Minnesota

5

“[A]ny communication made
through any available
technologies . . . [or] other
objects . . . .”

Mississippi

4

“[E]lectronic mail or
electronic communication”

Missouri

2

“[C]ommunication by any
means”

Massachusetts

Michigan

MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.749
(1b)(b) (West,
Westlaw through
2015 1st Spec.
Sess.)
MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-45-15
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
Reg. Sess.)
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 565.225 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 1st Reg.
Sess.)

94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015)

156

Jurisdiction

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Category

[Vol. 94

Communication Language

Citation
MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-220
(West, Westlaw
through July 2015
Sess.)

Montana

2

“[E]lectronic
communication . . . or any
other action, device, or
method”

Nebraska

1

N/A

N/A

“[U]se of an Internet or
network site, electronic mail,
text messaging or any other
similar means of
communication . . . .”
“[I]mpart a message by any
method of transmission,
including but not limited to
telephoning or personally
delivering or sending or
having delivered any
information or material by
written or printed note or
letter, package, mail, courier
service or electronic
transmission, including
electronic transmissions
generated or communicated
via a computer.”

NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.575
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
legislation)

Nevada

5

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 644:4
(West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg.
Sess.)

New
Hampshire

3

New Jersey

1

N/A

N/A

New Mexico

1

N/A

N/A

New York

1

N/A

N/A

4

“Any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature,
transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, computer,
electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photo-optical
system.”

N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-196.3 (2013)

2

“Communicates in writing or
by electronic communication
a threat . . . .”

N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-17-07
(LEXIS through
2015 Reg. Legis.
Sess.)

North Carolina

North Dakota

94 N.C. L. REV. 105 (2015)

2015]

Jurisdiction

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island
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Category

Communication Language

4

“[A]ny electronic method of
remotely transferring
information, including, but
not limited to, any computer,
computer network, computer
program, or computer
system . . . .”

4

4

“[A]ny type of telephonic,
electronic or radio
communications, or
transmission of signs, signals,
data, writings, images and
sounds or intelligence of any
nature by telephone, including
cellular telephones, wire,
cable, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system or the creation,
display, management, storage,
processing, transmission or
distribution of images, text,
voice, video or data by wire,
cable or wireless means,
including the Internet.”
“[E]lectronic mail, the
Internet, a telephone text
message or any other
transmission of information
by wire, radio, optical cable,
cellular system,
electromagnetic system or
other similar means.”

157

Citation

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN.
§ 2903.211
(LEXIS through
2015 legislation)

OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1172 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 1st Reg.
Sess.)

OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 166.065
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
Reg. Sess.)

3

“[E]lectronic means, including
telephone, electronic mail,
Internet, facsimile, telex,
wireless communication or
similar transmission”

18 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2709
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
Reg. Sess.)

2

“[Electronic] communication
by computer or other
electronic device”

11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-52-4.2
(LEXIS through
Jan. 2015 Sess.)
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South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas
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Category

Communication Language

Citation

5

“[A]ny transfer of signs,
signals, writings, images,
sounds, data, intelligence, or
information of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part
by any device, system, or
mechanism including, but not
limited to, a wire, radio,
computer, electromagnetic,
photoelectric, or photo-optical
system.”

S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-1700
(Supp. 2014)

2

“[A]ny verbal, electronic,
digital media, mechanical,
telegraphic, or written
communication”

S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-19A-1
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
Legis. Sess.)

4

4

“[I]ncluding, but not limited
to, text messaging, facsimile
transmissions, electronic mail
or Internet services . . . .”
“[T]ransfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic,
photoelectronic, or photooptical system.”

2

“[U]ses a computer, the
Internet, text messaging, or
any other electronic means to
commit an act that is a part of
the course of conduct.”

Vermont

2

“[T]elephone calls or other
electronic communications”

Virginia

2

“[U]se a computer or
computer network to
communicate . . . .”

Utah

[Vol. 94

TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-308
(Supp. 2012)
TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN.
§ 42.07 (West,
Westlaw through
2015 Legis.
Sess.)
UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5106.5 (LEXIS
through 2015
Gen. Sess.)
VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1027
(LEXIS through
2015 Reg. Sess.)
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-152.7:1
(2014)
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Washington

3

“[E]lectronic communication”

West Virginia

3

“[D]elivered or transmitted to
a specific person . . . .”

Wisconsin

Wyoming

5

4

“[A]ny transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of
any nature, or any transfer of
a computer program . . . .”
“Communicating,
anonymously or otherwise, or
causing a communication with
another person by verbal,
electronic, mechanical,
telegraphic, telephonic or
written means . . . .”

159

Citation
WASH. REV.
CODE ANN.
§ 9.61.260 (West,
Westlaw
through 2015
Spec. Sess.)
W. VA. CODE
§ 61-3C-14a
(West, Westlaw
through 2015
Reg. Sess.)
WIS. STAT.
§ 947.0125
(2015)

WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-506
(LEXIS through
2015 Legis.
Sess.)
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